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A STUDY OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
TEXTUALISM: THE SUPREME COURT'S
BANKRUPTCY CASES
ROBERT K. RASMUSSEN*
The Supreme Court has taken a turn toward text. Its recent opinions
in statutory cases by and large focus on the text of the statute in question.
Infrequent has become the opinion in which the Court relies on the "in-
tent" of the legislature as expressed in legislative history or on considera-
tion of the consequences of its decision. This change in interpretative
focus has been well noted;1 what remains in question is the propriety of
the Court's textualist approach.2 Most commentators reject textualism,
and instead argue that the Court should expressly resolve interpretive
issues through what is called "dynamic interpretation."3 The advocates
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful to the Dean's Fund at
Vanderbilt Law School for financial support. I would like to thank Rebecca Brown, Chuck Cam-
eron, Bill Eskridge, Phil Frickey, Jason Johnston, Dan Keating, Andy Rutten, David Skeel, George
Triantis and Nick Zeppos for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. David Bissinger and
Mike Smith provided helpful research assistance. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at
the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society.
1. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rav. 621 (1990);
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990
Sup. Cr. REV. 231 [hereinafter Schauer, Statutory Construction]; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice
Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597 (1991) [hereinafter
Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism]. For an empirical analysis of the sources that the Court cites in its
opinions, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1073 (1992) [hereinafter Zeppos, Use of Authority].
2. Support for a textualist approach can be found in Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Domains]; Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988);
Schauer, Statutory Construction, supra note 1; Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of
Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715 (1992) [hereinafter
Schauer, Response]; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989). For objections to textualism, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
22-69 (1990); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20
(1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 340-45 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1989); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation
of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1310-35
(1990).
3. Professor Eskridge coined the phrase "dynamic interpretation." See William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Dynamic Interpreta-
tion]. For a comprehensive explication of Eskridge's theory of dynamic interpretation, see WILLIAM
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of dynamic interpretation counsel that where the text of a statute is sus-
ceptible to more than one interpretation, the Court should adopt the in-
terpretation that generates the better consequences.' It is consequences,
not the text of the statute, that should be scrutinized to resolve hard
cases.
Despite the exhortation for judges to be attuned to the consequences of
their decisions, the proponents of dynamic interpretation have failed to
apply the same criteria to their own work. Those who reject textualism
tend to base their rejection on an analysis of a few cases in unrelated
areas of law.5 While these cases may give the writers the vehicle they
seek to make their points, they tell us little about the effects of the
Court's interpretative approach on any given substantive area of law.
Whatever the costs and benefits of textualism in a single case, they may
differ across a range of related cases. When evaluating a theory's merits,
it is dangerous to rely only on an examination of the outliers in the data
set.
This failure to examine a set of cases selected without regard to the
interpretative method used is the most conspicuous flaw in the literature
arguing for judges to use dynamic interpretation. This shortcoming is
more than a bit ironic; the literature which posits that judges should ex-
amine the consequences of their decision fails to examine in any system-
atic way the consequences of openly embracing dynamic interpretation.
Statutory interpretation theorists seem much more concerned with as-
sessing the interpretation process than with a systematic inquiry into the
results generated by the competing methods of interpretation. 6
To fill this void in the literature, this Article examines the Supreme
Court's statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code over the past
seven terms. This Article focuses on the past seven terms because that
period coincides with Justice Scalia's tenure on the Court. Justice Scalia
is the justice most credited with the Court's increasing reliance on statu-
tory text. Thus, this time period should generate a number of textualist
decisions.
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS, AND DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(forthcoming 1994).
4. See Posner, supra note 2, at 300; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 345-62; Eskridge,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 42-81.
6. See, eg., Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 2, at 362-83; Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Inter-
pretation, supra note 3, at 1538. This focus on process has been noted by Zeppos. See Zeppos, Use




This Article concentrates on bankruptcy law because bankruptcy is a
particularly apt area for assessing the systemic effects of textualist analy-
sis. Because current bankruptcy law dates only to 1978, the statute has
not been encrusted with a substantial number of earlier Supreme Court
decisions. This allows the Court to grapple with the Bankruptcy Code
(the "Code") rather than Supreme Court precedents. The newness of the
Code also pretermits the issue of how the Court should respond to statu-
tory obsolescence, an issue which differs from that of which interpretive
method the Court should use.7 Also favoring the selection of bankruptcy
is the fact that the Code was the product of a systematic effort by a con-
gressionally appointed commission to update this country's bankruptcy
laws.8 Furthermore, the Code has not been subjected to many amend-
ments.9 Thus, the Court is more likely to find coherent purposes in the
Bankruptcy Code than in other bodies of law which have been the sub-
ject of ad hoc legislation. Finally, there exists in the academy vigorous
inquiry into the normative foundations of bankruptcy law.10 Academic
interest in the substantive area of bankruptcy law is at an all-time high.
To the extent that statutory interpretation should be assessed by compar-
ing its output against the normative goals of the substantive area of law,
7. Compare GUIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (al-
lowing the Court to react to the problem of obsolescence by overruling the obsolete statute) with
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1481 n.7 (arguing for dynamic interpretation but expressly declining to go
as far as Calabresi) and Posner, supra note 2, at 300-01 (similar).
8. See COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 177 (1973).
9. Significant amendments were made in 1984 and 1986. See Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 352 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 & 28
U.S.C..). The 1984 amendment was largely in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
Pipeline Constr. Corp v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), which held that the Bank-
ruptcy Code's jurisdictional provisions unconstitutionally gave too much power to bankruptcy
courts. The 1986 Amendments were mainly concerned with adding a new provision, Chapter 12, to
deal with the problem of farm bankruptcies.
10. For differing views, see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (1986); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71
TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice]; Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay
on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming [hereinafter
Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy Rules]); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645, 646-49 (1992); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values:
A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815 (1987).
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it is much easier to find a theory of bankruptcy law than it is to find, say,
a theory of Medicare reimbursement.
Measuring the effects of the Supreme Court's interpretative practice
across bankruptcy law yields several important results. The first is that it
exposes the limits of the Court's textualism. Although textualism is the
dominant mode of statutory analysis, it is not the exclusive mode. The
Court will depart from textualism when it views such a departure as nec-
essary to protect governmental interests. This departure is ironic given
that one of the proffered reasons for textualism is to respect the alloca-
tion of decisionmaking authority specified by the Constitution.
The second and more significant point that the cases reveal is that tex-
tualism may be the appropriate strategy for deciding bankruptcy cases
from a consequentialist point of view. This conclusion results in part
from the Court's role in the administration of the Bankruptcy Code. Too
often, theories of interpretation focus exclusively on the Supreme
Court.I1 Yet the Court occupies only the top of the judicial hierarchy.
In the context of the Code, the cases reveal that the Supreme Court is
content to leave the bulk of the interpretative work to the lower courts.
The Court, absent a governmental interest, will only intervene to resolve
a conflict among the circuits. While it resolves these conflicts through a
textualist analysis, the lower courts often engage in dynamic
interpretation.
This divergence in interpretative strategies between the Supreme Court
and the lower courts may be the optimal result. A heated debate rages
over what constitutes appropriate bankruptcy policy in both the academy
and the lower courts. The decisions by the lower courts, which are more
fluent with bankruptcy policy, ensure that when cases reach the Court
policy justifications often exist for each of the competing results. The
Court then selects the result that best comports with the statutory text.
This strategy ensures that the textualist result is supported by some
bankruptcy policy, while at the same time allowing the Court to decide
such cases without engaging in the policy debate. Textualism is thus the
best pragmatic strategy for the Court to employ when interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code.
Part I of this Article sets forth the two dominant theories of statutory
interpretation currently advocated-textualism and dynamic interpreta-
11. See, e.g., Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 2; Eskridge, supra note 1; Sunstein, supra note




tion. Textualism, associated closely with the opinions of Justice Scalia,
rests on the notion that the text of a statute is the exclusive authority on
which the Court should rely when reaching its decision. When a statute
is ambiguous, the Court should ascribe to the statute that meaning which
most persons would ascribe to the language at issue. Legislative history
is not consulted, nor is a judge's sense of which interpretation imple-
ments the better social policy. In contrast, dynamic interpretation,
which is allied with the use of practical reasoning, uses the text of the
statute only as a starting point; the judge is free to consider other sources
such as legislative history and policy concerns in reaching a result. As
Judge Posner stated, "Maybe the best thing to do when a statute is in-
voked is to examine the consequences of giving the invoker what he
wants and then estimate whether those consequences will on the whole
be good ones."12
To assess the consequences of adopting one theory of statutory inter-
pretation or another, it is necessary to have an understanding of the sub-
stantive area of law involved. To this end, Part II of this Article
examines the various policies of bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy scholars
can be divided into two groups. In the first group are those who attempt
to explain extant law from an economic point of view. For these schol-
ars, bankruptcy law represents the hypothetical contract which the credi-
tors of the debtor would reach amongst themselves. The second group
consists of "traditional" scholars. The traditional scholars, in contrast,
view bankruptcy law as attempting to reconcile a number of competing
social policies. These scholars balance efficiency against concerns with
promoting reorganizations and protecting those on whom the burden of
financial distress falls most heavily.
After setting forth the competing theories of statutory interpretation
and the competing theories of bankruptcy law, Part III of this Article
examines the Supreme Court's bankruptcy cases over the last seven
terms. This examination confirms that the Court's methodology has
been predominantly textualist (hardly a surprising result). The Article
then offers both a positive theory of the role that the Court plays in bank-
ruptcy law and an argument as to why this role may be desirable from a
normative point of view. Unlike most theories of statutory interpreta-
tion, this argument focuses on the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the lower courts. When the lower courts are taken into ac-
12. Posner, supra note 2, at 300.
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count, it becomes far from evident that dynamic interpretation in the
Supreme Court would produce a better bankruptcy system than the one
that we now have. Dynamic interpretation thus fails the test that it sets
for itself; namely, it fails to produce better consequences.
I. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The process of statutory interpretation has become a topic of debate
both on the bench and in the academy. The old notion that a court's task
in interpreting a statute is to implement the intent of the legislature has
no serious defenders left in academia. 3 The two most prominent theo-
ries of statutory interpretation today are textualism and dynamic inter-
pretation. Each of these theories can be understood in differing ways,
depending on which aspect of the theory is emphasized and which
scholar describes the method. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, it is necessary to define the competing theories.
An opinion is textualist for the purposes of this Article if the Court's
analysis rests on a reading of the statute. Other sources may be cited in
the opinion, but they can only be used to buttress the result gleaned from
a close examination of the text. To be sure, other definitions of what
constitutes a textualist opinion exist. Extreme versions of textualism,
such as that practiced by Justice Scalia, allow the judge to rely only on
statutory language; she cannot confirm her reading of the text by an ex-
amination of legislative history or other nonstatutory materials. If textu-
alism is defined in such a way, it is difficult to find many textualist
opinions. 4 The Justices, like all good lawyers, attempt to marshall all
possible arguments for their side. Moreover, even when the Court relies
on the text of the statute, it often feels the need to refute arguments based
on legislative history. Thus, if one simply looks at the Court's citation
practice, it becomes apparent that the Court does not cite only textualist
sources.15 Rather than defining textualism in such a way as to ensure
that it has never been and will never be adopted, this Article will con-
sider an opinion as textualist if the Court relies primarily on the text of
13. See Zeppos, Use of Authority, supra note 1, at 1087. This is not to deny that the Supreme
Court even today occasionally decides cases on the basis of legislative intent. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS,
496 U.S. 53 (1990).
14. See Zeppos, Use of Authority, supra note 1, at 1103 (concluding that "the Court has not
adopted textualism as its methodology for deciding statutory cases" because the Court has cited





the statute to support its conclusion.16 Thus, this Article treats an opin-
ion as textualist even if the Court mentions legislative history so long as
this history is used only to confirm the Court's reading of the text. The
key is that legislative history is not consulted to clarify any ambiguity, let
alone used to overturn the statute's plain meaning.
Dynamic interpretation challenges the claims put forward by textual-
ism in at least two respects. The first is that, as a purely positive matter,
the Supreme Court does not engage in pure textualism. Rather, the
Court inevitably draws on matters other than statutory text in deciding
statutory cases. 1 7 The hermeneutical nature of interpretation ensures
that considerations other than the unadorned statutory language will
guide the decision which the interpreter reaches.18 The preferences and
experiences of the interpreter shape her reading of the language at issue.
Thus, dynamic interpretation is inevitable.
Dynamic interpretation challenges textualism in a second respect as
well. There is a difference between an opinion which is-or at least pur-
ports to be-textualist and one which expressly embraces dynamic inter-
pretation. The former purports to be following the statutory language
exclusively, while the latter expressly draws on other sources in reaching
a decision. As a normative matter, the proponents of dynamic interpre-
tation argue that courts should drop the fagade that they are not making
policy decisions and instead simply following the statutory language.' 9
Failing to address explicitly the competing policy concerns involved, tex-
tualism leads to decisions which lack a compelling theory for their result.
By expressly engaging in dynamic interpretation, courts would be forced
to confront the policy choice before them, and supply an explanation for
why one result should be favored over another. It is this methodological
difference which is the focus of this Article.
Proponents of dynamic interpretation propose a variety of ways in
which the court could proceed in implementing their call for reform. For
16. For a similar treatment of defining the Court's methodology, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347 n.38 (1991).
See also ESKRIDGE, JURISPRUDENCE ch. 8 (noting that Burger court's invocation of plain meaning
rule was usually accompanied with detailed examination of nonstatutory sources which confirmed
the text's "plain meaning").
17. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2 at 345-62.
18. See William N. Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609
(1990); ESKRIDGE, JURISPRUDENCE Ch. 2.
19. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 383 ("[Ihe Court could substantially improve its
performance if it more candidly reflected [the dynamic interpretative] process in its opinions.").
1993]
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example, Professor Sunstein argues that courts should expressly adopt a
series of substantive canons of construction to guide their decisions.2 °
These canons devolve from what Sunstein views as appropriate policy
concerns. Judge Posner proposes a more case-by-case approach under
which courts should weigh the consequences of the competing interpreta-
tions.21 Professors Eskridge and Frickey endorse what they view as the
Court's current use of various sources on a case-by-case basis but ask the
Court to be more candid in its opinions.22 Despite their differences, these
proponents of dynamic interpretation all share the core notion that the
Court should expressly consider sources other than the statutory text.
Dynamic interpretation proponents also believe that these sources should
reflect the current needs of society. All of these versions of dynamic in-
terpretation expressly incorporate policy concerns to help resolve diffi-
cult cases.
For the purpose of this Article, dynamic interpretation is defined as
follows.23 The Court begins with the text of the statute. If the statute
has a plain meaning, this meaning is given presumptive, but not conclu-
sive, effect. The Court next considers legislative history. The inquiry at
this level looks for both a specific congressional intent regarding the issue
at hand, and where such an intent does not exist, a more general congres-
sional intent regarding the purpose which the statute is designed to serve.
Up to this point, dynamic interpretation resembles the traditional at-
tempt to discern the intent of the legislature. As stated most notably by
Hart and Sacks, "A court should try to put itself in imagination in the
position of the legislature which enacted the measure .... It should as-
sume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was
made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably."'24
Dynamic interpretation, however, moves beyond the goal of recaptur-
ing--or imaginatively recreating-the legislature's intent. After consid-
ering materials contemporaneous with the drafting of the statute, the
Court then moves to considerations which have no connection to the
statutory text. The Court first looks at any relevant social or legal
20. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 111-59 (1990); Sunstein, supra note
2.
21. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
22. See Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 2.
23. This is taken from Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 2.
24. HENRY M. HART, JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS




changes that have taken place since the statute was enacted. The Court
concludes by considering current values. In the case of bankruptcy law,
these values would include the policies that bankruptcy law should try to
effectuate. These last two inquires are consequentialist in the sense that
they evaluate the consequences of the competing interpretations.
To illustrate the difference between these two methods of interpreta-
tion, consider the Supreme Court's opinion in Farrey v. Sanderfoot.2
The Bankruptcy Code affords an individual debtor a fresh start in life by
allowing the debtor both to jettison certain debts and retain certain as-
sets. The Code itself delineates those debts that are discharged.26 The
assets that the debtor can keep-the debtor's exempt property-are de-
termined by a combination of state and federal law. The Code contains a
set of federal exemptions,27 but it also allows states to opt out of these
provisions and force their citizens to select state-created exemptions in-
stead.2" Most states have taken this option. Even where states have cho-
sen this option, federal law still determines the extent to which a debtor
or creditor may impair the applicable exemptions.29
In Farrey, the Court interpreted the reach of bankruptcy law's protec-
tion of exempt assets. The Bankruptcy Code, in section 522(f), allows
"the debtor [to] avoid the fixing of a [judicial] lien on an interest... in
property."30 Thus, to the extent that a creditor obtains a judicial lien
which impairs an exemption, federal law voids the lien. The debtor in
Farrey divorced his wife prior to his filing for bankruptcy. The property
settlement awarded him the marital home, but ordered him to pay his
wife approximately half of the equity interest in the house. The court
order approving the settlement attached a lien to the house in favor of
the wife to secure this obligation. Rather than paying his obligation, the
husband filed for bankruptcy in an attempt to avoid the lien. State law
gave the husband a $40,000 exemption for the equity in the house. Be-
cause the total equity in the house was only $60,000, Sanderfoot asserted
that his erstwhile wife's lien impaired his exemption (he would only re-
ceive $30,000 if the lien were enforced and $40,000 if it were not). This
impairment, Sanderfoot argued, required that the lien be avoided.
25. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1988).
30. Id.
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The Court's analysis focused on the text of the statute. The Court
noted that "[n]o one asserts that the two verbs underlying the provision
possess anything other than their standard legal meaning: 'avoid' mean-
ing 'annul' or 'undo' and 'fix' meaning to 'fasten a liability upon.' "31
The Court then argued that "[t]he gerund 'fixing' refers to a temporal
event. . . . Therefore, unless the debtor had the property interest to
which the lien attached at some point before the lien attached to that
interest, he or she cannot avoid the fixing of the lien under the terms of
[section] 522(f)(1)." 32 The Court thus read the text of the statute and
discovered in its language a clear meaning.
The Court's analysis, however, did not stop with the text. It canvassed
the legislative history and concluded that "[t]his reading fully comports
with the provision's purpose and history. '3 3 Thus, while the Court's
analysis is textualist in that it relies mainly on the language of the statute,
it is not Justice Scalia's extreme form of textualism which shuns legisla-
tive history as if it were the face of Medusa. Rather, it is a textualism
which bases its result on the statutory language, but also invokes other
arguments if they are available. The Court, however, does not turn to
legislative history to provide the interpretative answer. Legislative his-
tory merely confirms the result generated by a careful scrutiny of the
statute. Moreover, the Court does not examine the consequences of read-
ing the statute in the manner advocated by the husband. 4
Having decided that the text of section 522(f) required it to determine
when the wife's lien attached, the Court turned to state law.3" The hus-
band conceded that under Wisconsin law the interest that he held prior
to the divorce decree was terminated, and his new interest created, by the
decree.36 This being the case, the interest to which the lien attached did
not exist prior to the lien, and thus section 522(f) could not be used to
avoid the lien. The Court opined that the result would remain the same
even if the divorce decree merely increased the husband's interest from
an undivided half ownership to a full ownership because, in the Court's
31. 111 S. Ct. at 1829 (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See also C. Robert Morris, Bankruptcy Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of
Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REv. 265, 286 (1992) ("Justice White... relied neither on function or
policy.").





view, the lien would only attach to the wife's half interest.37
The textualist nature of the Supreme Court's opinion is highlighted by
comparing it to Judge Posner's dissent in the court of appeals.3" The
majority in the Seventh Circuit held that the husband could in fact avoid
the wife's lien. 39 Although Judge Posner in dissent reached the same
result as the Supreme Court, he did so by a very different route. He
began with an explanation of how Sanderfoot was attempting to defraud
his wife. Sanderfoot was clearly in bankruptcy court to deprive his wife
of the property she was given in the divorce decree. Unlike the Supreme
Court, Judge Posner focused immediately on the consequences of what
he was being asked to do rather than the precise statutory language. He
then noted that this attempt to defeat the divorce decree was not encom-
passed within the purpose of section 522(0, which is "to thwart un-
secured creditors who, sensing impending bankruptcy, rush into court to
obtain liens on exempt property, thus frustrating the purpose of the ex-
emptions."' Only after making these points, did Judge Posner argue
that the statutory language does not require what would clearly be an
unjust result. For Judge Posner, the interpretation of the text was closely
tied to the consequences of deciding one way or the other. This is dy-
namic interpretation at its finest.4
Farrey thus illustrates the contrast between a textualist and a dynamic
approach to statutory interpretation. It is interesting to note, however,
that despite the different methods used by the Supreme Court and Judge
Posner, both reach the same result. It thus does not follow that the
choice between textualism and dynamic interpretation necessarily im-
plies a choice between different results. To be sure, most scholars treat
the two methods as fundamentally distinct. Those studying statutory in-
terpretation usually place textualism and dynamic interpretation at op-
posite ends of the spectrum, and from a legal process perspective they
certainly are. What scholars have failed to examine is the extent to
which the competing methods of interpretation generate different results
37. Id. at 1831. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, concurred. They agreed with the
Court's interpretation of section 522(f) and that Sanderfoot's concession settled the case. They dis-
agreed, however, with the proposition that section 522(0 would not avoid a lien if the decree had
merely augmented Sanderfoot's rights.
38. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
39. 899 F.2d at 598.
40. Id. at 606.
41. The most complete treatment of the issue inFarrey is Morris, supra note 34, who concludes
in regards to the Court's opinion that "[e]verything is wrong except the conclusion." Id. at 288.
1993]
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across a randomly chosen set of cases. Most law review articles that
discuss the two theories deal with selected cases in which the theories
generate different results. Yet the cases discussed are rarely, if ever, from
the same doctrinal area. 2 For example, in their seminal article on the
use of practical reasoning in statutory interpretation, Professors Eskridge
and Frickey discuss only the following seven cases: the landmark affirma-
tive action case of United Steelworkers v. Weber;43 Griffin v. Oceanic Con-
tractors, Inc.,' which dealt with wages owed to a maritime worker; Bob
Jones University v. United States,45 which held that a private school prac-
ticing race discrimination could not receive tax-exempt status; Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States,46 the classic case involving the employ-
ment of foreign clergy members; McNally v. United States,47 which inter-
preted the federal mail fraud statute; Bryan v. Itasca County,48 which
concerned the state of Minnesota's power to tax the property of an In-
dian on a reservation; and United States v. Kozminski,49 which inter-
preted a statute that criminalized involuntary servitude. Similarly, Judge
Posner's analysis of statutory interpretation in The Problems of Jurispru-
dence, discusses three cases: United States v. Locke, 0 which considered
the proper interpretation of a time limit to file mining claims on federal
lands; Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 1 which addressed whether Con-
gress had implicitly reserved an easement when it made a land grant to
the Union Pacific Railroad; and Weber.
42. A recent exception to this is Eskridge's discussion of the Supreme Court's labor injunction
cases from 1877-1932. See ESKRIDGE, JURISPRUDENCE, Ch 3. To be sure, there are articles which
look at the Supreme Court's cases from a specific area. They do not, however, evaluate the textual-
ist/dynamic interpretation choice in these areas. Rather, they criticize the Court for not following
the policy which the author advocates. In other words, they assume, rather than justify, the propri-
ety of dynamic interpretation. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code:
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 819, 844 (1991) ("The
tax system will function only if the law achieves a reasonable degree of logic and consistency.");
Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bank-
ruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 827 (1991) ("One unfortu-
nate result of the Court's textualism has been a marked lack of any broader conceptual focus in
bankruptcy jurisprudence.").
43. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
44. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
45. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
46. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
47. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
48. 426 U.S. 373 (1986).
49. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
50. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).




What is striking about the cases is that they have little, if any, substan-
tive relation to one another. Certainly giving a list of the issues in these
cases to lawyers and asking them to discern a pattern would elicit no
response except amazement. Of course, the cases are related to the point
that the author is attempting to make. They are selected because they
are cases where interpretation matters. This selection bias gives the
reader a false impression of the stakes in choosing the appropriate inter-
pretive method. The skewed sample of cases makes it appear as if the
wide difference in the procedural aspects of textualism and dynamic in-
terpretation leads to a wide difference in results.
This intentional selection bias raises the obvious question: What is the
overall effect of choosing one interpretive method over another? Only by
examining a random sample of cases can one get a true idea of the sys-
temic costs and benefits of both textualism and dynamic interpretation.
To produce such an assessment, this Article considers the bankruptcy
cases which the Supreme Court has decided over the past seven terms.
Part II of this Article delineates the policies of bankruptcy law. These
policies are then used in analyzing the impact of the Court's methodolog-
ical choice between textualism and dynamic interpretation.
II. THE POLICIES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
Academic writing on corporate bankruptcy law consists of two differ-
ent strands: the economic account and the traditional account. The eco-
nomic account of bankruptcy law contains both normative and positive
elements. The normative strand of economic analysis attempts to specify
the optimal set of insolvency rules. Much of the recent work in this area
argues for fundamental change in extant law. Reform proposals include:
the total abolition of bankruptcy law;52 the institution of an auction re-
gime for firms that file for bankruptcy;53 and, the adoption by Congress
of a menu of different insolvency regimes from which firms select when
they are formed.54 To the extent that this normative analysis casts doubt
52. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bank-
ruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991);
Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043
(1992).
53. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming
April 1993).
54. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 10.
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upon congressional decisions embodied in the Code, it offers little aid in
assessing the outcome of the Court's interpretative efforts. Even the
most ardent supporters of allowing judges to consider social policy in
interpreting statutes do not counsel courts to simply ignore congressional
judgments and replace them with their own (or even those offered by
economists!). Normative criticism of congressional decisions embodied
in existing law thus provides little input to the appropriate interpretation
of such law.
The positive economic analysis of bankruptcy law, which attempts to
explain the fundamental aspects of existing law from an efficiency stand-
point, provides a better basis for assessing the Supreme Court's decisions
in bankruptcy cases. This analysis purports to describe extant law from
the standpoint of efficiency. It also provides a tool for judges who use
dynamic interpretation. In cases in which the Bankruptcy Code and its
accompanying legislative history provide no definitive answer, a court
which embraces dynamic interpretation coupled with the positive eco-
nomic account of bankruptcy law would select the interpretation which
it viewed as best promoting efficiency.
The most complete explication of the efficiency-related description of
bankruptcy law is the Creditors' Bargain theory developed by Professors
Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson." Like the Bankruptcy Code, the
Creditors' Bargain takes existing state debt collection law as a given.5 6
Bankruptcy law thus responds to the deficiencies contained in these laws.
Baird and Jackson argue that the deficiency to which federal bankruptcy
law responds is a common pool problem.5 Such a problem exists where
individual members of a group have rights to the same assets, but there
are insufficient assets to satisfy the desires of the group as a whole. In
such a situation, each individual member has an incentive to take actions
that harm the group's overall welfare.
In the case of an insolvent firm, the common pool problem identified
by Baird and Jackson is that individual creditors using state law remedies
to collect their debts could well initiate the piecemeal liquidation of the
debtor, even though such liquidation does not fetch top dollar for the
55. Most of the conclusions of these two authors can be found in DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE
ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (1992) and Jackson, supra note 10. I do not mean to suggest that
Baird and Jackson's view of bankruptcy law is solely positive. Rather, they offer a normative theory
which is designed to explain the major attributes of extant law.
56. See Baird, supra note 10, at 818-19.
57. For an argument that there is no common pool problem in this context, see Picker, supra




firm's assets.5" Moreover, creditors will spend significant resources to
ensure that they are not left at the end of the line.5 9 Thus, efficiency is
increased by a collective proceeding such as bankruptcy which maxi-
mizes the expected return to the creditors." Inside of the collective pro-
ceeding the debtor's assets are allocated to the existing creditors in the
priority specified by state law. This allocation is necessary to ensure that
a bankruptcy proceeding is initiated only when it solves a collective ac-
tion problem rather than as an attempt by a party to garner the benefits
of a bankruptcy-only priority.6" Baird and Jackson have explained a
number of the provisions of the current Code using this conception of the
policy animating bankruptcy law.62
The competing view of corporate bankruptcy law, which this Article
labels the "traditional" view, treats bankruptcy law as a vehicle for deal-
ing with the problems that arise when a firm becomes financially dis-
tressed.63 This view holds that various parties are injured when a firm
does not have sufficient resources to pay all of its claimants, and that it is
the task of bankruptcy law to decide how the losses will be allocated.
The traditional view does not dispute the economic argument that bank-
ruptcy should solve a common pool problem by preventing a destructive
race to the debtor's assets; what this view disputes is that this is the only
goal of bankruptcy law. In deciding how the hardship caused by finan-
cial distress should be distributed, proponents of the traditional view as-
sert that various factors should be considered and weighed against each
other. These factors include: the relative hardships that loss will cause to
the competing parties; the concern for employee's retaining jobs; equality
among creditors; and the needs of the surrounding community." As a
general matter, perhaps the two biggest concerns of the traditional mode
58. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 12-15.
59. Id. at 16.
60. The legislative history accompanying the Bankruptcy Code embraces this justification for
bankruptcy. See H.R. REP No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977) ("Bankruptcy is designed
to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of
diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that.").
61. See Baird, supra note 10.
62. See, eg., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Credi-
tors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (explaining Code's treatment of certain contract provisions
and state created priorities ); Jackson, supra note 10, at 122-50 (explaining preference law); Douglas
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1199
(1984) (explaining Code's treatment of environmental cleanup obligations).
63. See, eg., Warren, supra note 10; Korobkin, supra note 10.
64. See Warren, supra note 10, at 789-93.
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of analysis are creditor equality and the promotion of reorganization over
liquidation. This view of bankruptcy is often indeterminate. By seeking
to promote different policies, the traditional view of bankruptcy often
generates competing arguments. The traditional view, however, cannot
provide criteria for choosing between these arguments. As described by
Professor Elizabeth Warren, one of its leading proponents, the tradi-
tional view of bankruptcy is "a dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected
view of bankruptcy from which [one] can neither predict outcomes nor
even necessarily fully articulate all the factors relevant to a policy
decision."65
The literature on individual bankruptcy law also consists of an eco-
nomic account and a traditional account. Central to both accounts is the
fundamental difference between corporate and individual bankruptcy
law; namely, that the latter contains a fresh start policy for debtors not
found in the former. The individual is entitled to discharge debts to ob-
tain a clean slate and hence a "fresh start" in life. Such a policy has little
meaning in the case of corporations, and is not part of corporate bank-
ruptcy law. In the case of individuals, however, there exists a wide con-
sensus that such a fresh start policy is desirable. The basis for the fresh
start policy is, however, open to question. The economic account has
difficulty in justifying the current contours of this policy, especially the
fact that individuals cannot waive its protections.66
As a positive matter, the economic account of bankruptcy views bank-
ruptcy's fresh start policy as a form of mandatory insurance against the
incurring of substantial debt; all persons are promised that if they be-
come insolvent, they can discharge their debts and start life anew. Like
all insurance schemes, "bankruptcy insurance" creates a moral hazard
problem.67 In the case of bankruptcy law, the problem is that a generous
fresh start provision creates an incentive for persons to engage in risky
ventures.6" In other words, the economic account of individual bank-
65. Id. at 811. I have argued elsewhere that, contrary to the implication of traditional bank-
ruptcy theorists, social justice requires that bankruptcy law be focused solely on efficiency. See
Rasmussen, supra note 10.
66. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1393 (1985).
67. On moral hazard problems, see generally DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIc THEORY 57-79 (1990); Richard S. Higgins, Products Liability Insurance, Moral
Hazard, and Contributory Negligence, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 111 (1981); Daniel Keating, Pension In-
surance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 65, 67-68.
68. See Michelle J. White, Economic versus Sociological Approaches to Legal Research: The




ruptcy law focuses on the incentive effects of such law without providing
a normative basis for such law in the first instance.
In contrast, the traditional account of individual bankruptcy focuses
on the plight of the "honest but unfortunate debtor." '69 The core notion
here is that individuals often become insolvent through no fault of their
own, and therefore deserve relief from their past obligations. The key
question is how much relief do these persons deserve, with little attention
paid to incentive effects created.70 Thus, the crucial difference between
the economic and traditional accounts of individual bankruptcy law is
that the former focuses on the ex ante incentives created by such law, and
the latter focuses on the ex post relief granted by the very same law.71
With the competing visions of bankruptcy policy now in place, this
Article now turns to the Court's recent forays into the bankruptcy arena.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S BANKRUPTCY CASES
The Supreme Court's increased reliance on statutory text is generally
associated with Justice Scalia's joining the Court in the 1986 Term.72
Since the advent of Scalia's tenure, which now spans seven terms, the
Court has decided twenty-eight bankruptcy cases. Eighteen of those de-
cisions have come in the last three terms. For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, I have omitted two cases from this sample because they center on the
constitutional issue of when a right to a jury trial exists in bankruptcy,73
and thus have no relevance to the Court's method of statutory interpreta-
tion.74 I have also omitted from the sample a third case which deals with
the tax treatment of a firm in bankruptcy and turns solely on the inter-
Legal Research]; Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An
Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. I (1987).
69. This stock phrase comes from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
70. See White, Approaches to Legal Research, supra note 68, at 686 (for traditional scholars
"bankruptcy filings are never the result of strategic calculations by individuals"). For an analysis
using the disparate factors which traditionalists view as driving discharge, see Margaret Howard, A
Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987).
71. The appropriate temporal perspective often dictates the results in corporate bankruptcy law
as well. I have argued elsewhere that once the appropriate temporal baseline is established it be-
comes evident that the policies proffered by the champions of the traditional view of bankruptcy are
best served by an efficient bankruptcy rules. See Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy Rules, supra note
10.
72. See Eskridge, supra note 1; Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 1.
73. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S.
42 (1990).
74. For those interested in this issue, see Douglas G. Baird, The Seventh Amendment and Jury
Trials in Bankruptcy, 1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 261.
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pretation of the tax code.7" Finally, a fourth case, which deals with the
interpretation of a prior Supreme Court case rather than with the Code
itself, has been omitted. 76 Of the remaining twenty-four cases in the sam-
ple, nine involve issues that arise either exclusively or predominantly in
cases involving corporate bankruptcy, 77 twelve involve issues that arise
most often in personal bankruptcy,7" two involve the question whether
the Code waives the government's sovereign immunity,79 and one in-
volves the relationship between the Code's appellate jurisdiction provi-
sions and the general appellate jurisdiction provisions of the United
States Code.8 0
Two points readily emerge from reading the entire set of the Supreme
Court's bankruptcy cases. The first point, which is qualified by the sec-
ond, is that the Court often employs textualism when resolving such
cases. Most of the Court's decisions rest on its reading of the statutory
language. The second point is that the triumph of textualism is not com-
plete; at times the Court diverges from a textualist approach. Subpart
III(A) of this Article explores when the Court uses textualism and when
it does not. As a matter of positive political theory, the Court's depar-
ture from textualism occurs when the Court seeks to protect governmen-
tal interests. Subpart 111(B) contains the major thesis of the Article. It
argues that when the Supreme Court's position in the judicial hierarchy
is considered, the Court's textualist approach produces better conse-
quences than would the overt use of dynamic interpretation. The gist of
the argument is that the results generated by textualism do not diverge
greatly from those that would have been generated by dynamic interpre-
75. California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
76. Norwest Bank v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
77. See Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 113 S.
Ct. 1489 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct.
1021 (1992); MCorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991); Union
Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990); United States v. Energy
Resources, Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enters, 489 U.S. 235 (1989); United
Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
78. See Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 61 U.S.L.W 4531 (1993); Rake v. Wade, No. 92-
621 (1993); Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992);
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S, Ct. 1825 (1991);
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991); Owen
v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991); Pennsylvania Dept. of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
79. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992); Hoffman v. Connecticut
Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).




tation, and that given the Court's limited role in administering the Bank-
ruptcy Code, it is preferable to leave the policy-making role to the lower
courts.
A. The Supreme Court's Textualism: Its Pervasiveness and Its Limits
The Supreme Court's bankruptcy cases evince a definite trend toward
textualist interpretation. Of the twenty-four bankruptcy cases decided in
the past seven terms involving statutory interpretation, the Court
adopted a textualist approach in nineteen of them.81 Added to these
cases is a twentieth case which one could read as a textualist opinion.82
Thus, the Court's interpretative method diverges from textualism in only
four of twenty-four bankruptcy cases, or seventeen percent. This textual-
ist shift has been noted in the Court's statutory opinions as a general
matter.3 What is interesting is the cases in which the Court abandoned
textualism. These cases are not a random sample of cases in the study.
Rather, they provide insight into the limits of the Court's textualist
approach.
The limits of the Court's textualist approach do not emanate from
bankruptcy policy. In none of the four cases in which the Court aban-
doned textualism did the Court rely on bankruptcy policy in interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code. In one case, the Court, faced with an ambiguous
statute, searched for the intent of the legislature as evinced in the legisla-
tive history.84 In the other three cases, the Court actually ignored rela-
tively clear statutes to further governmental interests.
8 5
81. See Rake v. Wade, No. 92-621 (1993); Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 61 U.S.L.W.
4531 (1993); Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 113 S.
Ct. 1489 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain,
112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992); Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S.
Ct. 1021 (1992); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S.
Ct. 1644 (1992); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S.
Ct. 2150 (1991); MCorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991);
Owen v. Owen, III S. Ct. 1833 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991); Union Bank v.
Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991); Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552
(1990); United States v. Energy Resources, Co., (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S.
235 (1989); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
82. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
83. See Eskridge, supra note 1; Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 1.
84. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990). Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia refused to join the
Court's opinion. He concurred in the Court's judgment based on his reading of the statutory text at
issue. Id. at 67-71.
85. Twice the Court overrode a relatively clear text to further the judicially created policy of
immunizing the government from suit. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992);
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The one case in which the Supreme Court relied on the intent of the
legislature demonstrates that the Court has refused to embrace Justice
Scalia's extreme form of textualism. Begier v. IRS86 deals with a debtor's
liabilities regarding the payment of so-called "trust-fund" taxes. These
are taxes which employers must withhold from employee pay checks.
The withheld funds are held in "trust" for the federal government.8 7 The
Court in Begier faced the issue of whether trust fund taxes paid by the
debtor shortly before the filing for bankruptcy were a voidable preference
under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court held that they were not.
As a general matter, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the
trustee to recapture certain payments made by the debtor to unsecured or
undersecured creditors ninety days prior to the filing for bankruptcy.88
For a payment to be a preference, the debtor must transfer "property of
the estate" to the creditor.8 9 "Property of the estate" is defined in section
541(a) to include all property in which the debtor has a legal or equitable
interest.90 Section 541(d) of the Code, however, excludes from "property
of the estate" property that the debtor holds in trust for another.9' Thus,
in the context of Begier, to the extent that monies that the debtor paid to
the IRS came from a trust of which the IRS was the beneficiary, these
monies were not property of the debtor's estate, and hence the transfer of
these funds to the IRS could not be set aside as preferential transfers.
The statutory scheme governing the payment of trust fund taxes makes
it clear that by the time the debtor paid the monies to the government,
they had become trust fund monies. All monies paid to the IRS by the
corporation are trust fund monies by definition. 92 This conclusion, how-
ever, does not resolve the issue. While the payment of the monies to the
IRS may not be a preferential transfer, the conversion of funds from the
debtor's sole property into monies held in trust for the IRS might itself
be a preferential transfer. If this were the case, the IRS would still have
to refund the monies that it received to the extent that such monies be-
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989). In the third case, the
Court turned to policies emanating from federalism rather than a close analysis of the statutory text
to reach the result that it did. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
86. Begier, 496 U.S. at 53.
87. 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1988).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1988).




came trust fund monies within ninety days of the debtor's fMling for bank-
ruptcy.93 The debtor in Beiger never placed the monies that it withheld
from its employees in a separate account.94 Thus, if the monies acquired
trust fund status only when they were actually paid, the IRS would still
face preference liability.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the monies paid to the IRS
had acquired trust fund status at the time that the monies were withheld
from the employees' paychecks. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
first looked to the relevant tax statute, which provides that the trust is
established whenever the employer "collect[s] or withhold[s]" the
amount of the tax.9" Relying on its reading of this language, the Court
held that the trust is created when the employees are paid.96
One issue remained to be resolved. The Court still had to decide
whether the particular dollars that were paid to the IRS were funds that
were held in trust. In other words, there was a problem of tracing the
monies that were withheld from the paychecks to those monies that were
ultimately paid. It is one thing to say that the debtor held monies in trust
for the IRS; it is quite another to say that the monies which the IRS
received were the monies which were held in trust. Tracing was a prob-
lem in Begier because the tax code places a trust on the "amount" of the
taxes rather than any specific funds, and the debtor in Begier did not
maintain a segregated account for trust fund taxes. Thus, one cannot use
normal tracing rules for trust funds because it is unclear which monies
were held in trust. Indeed, the entire inquiry seems a bit metaphysical.
When monies are "withheld" from an employee's paycheck, the em-
ployee has simply received less than the employee otherwise would. No
identifiable funds exist which would have been the employee's but for the
withholding. Nevertheless, the Court had to decide whether the monies
paid to the IRS could be deemed to be the monies that were withheld
from the employees' paychecks.
The Court found no statutory guidance on this issue.97 Neither the
Bankruptcy Code nor the Internal Revenue Code addressed the tracing
issue.98 Faced with this lack of guidance, the Court turned to the legisla-
93. See 11 USC § 550 (stipulating party for whose benefit transfer is made incurs liability).
94. 496 U.S. at 56.
95. 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1988).
96. 496 U.S. at 61-62.
97. Id. at 62.
98. The Court did not mention its earlier decision under the Bankruptcy Act of Cunningham v.
Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). Some lower courts have read Cunningham as holding that federal bank-
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tive history of the Bankruptcy Code. This history stated quite clearly
both that all voluntary payments by the debtor to the IRS were by defini-
tion trust fund payments (a conclusion which the Court had reached
through textual analysis), and, more importantly, that the payments had
been trust fund monies since the time that they were withheld. 9 The
legislative history thus supplied the sole basis for the Court's ultimate
decision.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. Not surprisingly, he found
the majority's use of legislative history objectionable. 100 Justice Scalia
claimed, however, that a close reading of the text of the Internal Revenue
Code would yield the same result. Justice Scalia argued that the trust
arose when the taxpayer identified the funds as trust funds monies by
writing a check to the IRS, but that this identification meant that the
monies had been held in trust at the time of withholding. In other words,
Justice Scalia, unlike the majority, found that the statute itself required a
relation back from the time of identification to the time of withholding.
Justice Scalia reached this conclusion because he read the tax statute as
evincing an intent to create a trust immediately upon the withholding of
the taxes from the employees' wages. 101
Begier thus provides some insight into the limits of the Supreme
Court's textualist approach. The lesson from Begier is that a majority of
the Court is willing to look at legislative history when the statute itself
provides no guidance. In Begier the Court had perhaps the most compel-
ling case for relying on legislative history; no statute appeared to address
the issue and legislative history spoke directly to the point. Only Justice
Scalia was content to ignore the clear legislative history and strain to
resolve the case by drawing inferences from the statutory text.
Cases like Begier, with no textual guidance and clear legislative history
on point, inevitably arise. That the court chooses to follow the legislative
history is not surprising nor terribly interesting. More interesting than
Begier for insight into the limits of the Supreme Court's current interpre-
tative approach are the remaining three cases in which the Court de-
parted from textualism. In these cases the court reached a result
ruptcy law itself requires that those claiming to have received monies held in trust be able to trace
the monies they received to the monies that were in trust. See Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966). The Court's decision in Begier, by not imposing a strict
tracing requirement, implicitly rejects this reading of Cunningham.
99. 496 U.S. at 63-67.
100. Id. at 67.




contrary to that indicated by the language of the Bankruptcy Code.
These cases are Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Mainte-
nance,"0 2 United States. v. Nordic Village, Inc.,"'3 and Kelly v. Robin-
son.""° In Hoffman and Nordic Village, the Court overrode clear
statutory language and legislative history to construe the Bankruptcy
Code's waiver of sovereign immunity narrowly, while in Kelly the Court
engaged in dynamic interpretation to protect a government's restitution
order from discharge.
Consider first the interpretative issues regarding the Bankruptcy
Code's waiver of sovereign immunity. Section 106 of the Code has three
subsections, each of which contains a waiver of the sovereign immunity
of both federal and state governments. The first two waivers, contained
in subsections (a) and (b) are quite narrow. Subsection (a) waives the
government's immunity against claims which arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence as did a claim which the government is assert-
ing against the debtor. Subsection (b) waives sovereign immunity against
any claim to the extent that that claim is used as a setoff against a claim
which the government is asserting against the debtor. Subsection (c) is
broader. Section 106(c)(1) provides that "notwithstanding any assertion
of sovereign immunity.., a provision of this title that contains 'creditor,'
'entity,' or 'governmental unit' applies to governmental units."'05 Sec-
tion 106(c)(2) further provides that a decision under a provision which
contains the trigger words listed in subsection (c)(1) "binds governmen-
tal units."
The Court first addressed this statutory scheme in Hoffman v. Con-
necticut Department of Income Maintenance. 0 In Hoffman, a plurality
of the Court held that section 106(c) did not waive a state's immunity
against a money judgment issued by the bankruptcy court under a sec-
tion of the Code which contained one of the trigger words listed in sec-
tion 106(c). The Court noted that sections 106(a) and (b) clearly waive
the government's sovereign immunity for a narrow set of money judg-
ments. Accordingly, the plurality held that subsection (c) applies only to
injunctive or declaratory relief."0 7 The plurality bolstered its argument
102. 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
103. 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992).
104. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988).
106. 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
107. Id. at 101-02.
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by noting that subsection (c)(2) would have been unnecessary if subsec-
tion (c)(1) were as broad a waiver of immunity as the debtor con-
tended."' 8 The plurality concluded by invoking the court's previous
cases under which legislative history could not be used to find a waiver of
sovereign immunity even if the statutory language was ambiguous.10 9
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, arguing that Congress does
not have the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity. 110 Justice
O'Connor issued a brief statement noting that she agreed with Justice
Scalia, but also with the plurality's interpretation of section 106(c) and
therefore joined that opinion. 1
Four justices dissented. Justice Marshall found the language of section
106(c) "unmistakably clear."11 2 Responding to the majority's argument
concerning the redundancy between sections 106(c)(1) and (2), Justice
Marshall saw in such overlap the efforts of drafters attempting to satisfy
the court's earlier sovereign immunity cases by making the waiver of sov-
ereign immunity as clear as possible. Justice Stevens joined Justice Mar-
shall's opinion, but also issued a separate opinion in which he reviewed
section 106(c)'s legislative history and concluded that it supported Jus-
tice Marshall's interpretation. This history revealed that section 106 as
originally drafted contained only subsections (a) and (b). Subsection (c)
was added later, and its sponsors stated that it was intended as an express
waiver of sovereign immunity covering many issues. Thus, section 106
was not written as an integrated whole. This history explains the con-
trast between the narrow waivers found in subsections (a) and (b) and the
broad waiver contained in subsection (c).
Hoffman thus left the precise scope of subsection 106(c) unresolved.
Four justices opined that the provision did not waive a government's sov-
ereign immunity for monetary damages, while four other justices argued
that it did. The Court resolved this conflict in United States v. Nordic
108. Id. at 102.
109. Id. at 103-04. The Court first enunciated the requirement that the language be unmistaka-
bly clear without resort to legislative history in 1985, seven years after Congress enacted the Code.
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). Eskridge and Frickey have noted that
the Court's change to a super-clear statement rule in the sovereign immunity area "has played a kind
of 'bait and switch' trick on Congress." William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593,
622 (1992).
110. 492 U.S. at 105.
111. Id.




Village. 113 Here the question was whether section 106(c) waived the fed-
eral government's immunity to monetary damages. The answer was no.
This time a majority of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,
endorsed the reading of section 106(c) advanced by the plurality in Hoff-
man. The Court began by noting that waivers of sovereign immunity are
to be strictly construed. The opinion then noted that subsection (c)
stands in contrast to the narrow waivers of subsections (a) and (b).
Moreover, the application of subsection (c) to monetary claims would
reduce the independent effect of these first two subsections to "trivial
application[s]."1 14 Also, such a reading would give no independent effect
to subsection (c)(2). Under the Court's interpretation, the sole effect of
section 106(c)'s waiver of sovereign immunity is to allow the bankruptcy
court to determine and discharge a debt which the debtor owed to the
government.
The Court also proffered a second reading of the statutory language.
It suggested that perhaps the application of subsection (c) was limited by
the requirements of subsections (a) and (b). In other words, the waiver
in subsection (c) only reaffirmed the waiver contained in the first two
requirements. Thus, the redundancy in the statute was not between sub-
sections (c)(1) and (c)(2), but rather between subsections (a) and (b) on
the one hand, and subsection (c) on the other. The Court admitted that
its reading of the text was not the only possible one, but opined this read-
ing was "plausible" and hence enough to prevent the statute from waiv-
ing the government's immunity.115 The Court again refused to consult
the legislative history to clear up what is at best an ambiguous statute.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, again dissented. The dis-
sent again noted that subsection (c) states that "notwithstanding any as-
sertion of sovereign immunity," if a Code provision contains one of the
trigger words, it applies to the government and the government is bound
by the bankruptcy court's determination. Thus, "[t]he literal text of the
Act unquestionably forecloses the defense of sovereign immunity.""1 6
Moreover, this reading was confirmed by section 106(c)'s legislative his-
113. 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1991).
114. Id. at 1015.
115. One can compare Justice Scalia's position in the context of sovereign immunity with his
general position on how statutes should be read. See, eg., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2372
(1991) ("[O]ur job is not to scavenge the world of English usage to discover whether there is any
possible meaning of [statutory language] which suits our preconception ... ; our job is to determine
... the ordinary meaning [of the words].").
116. 112 S. Ct. at 1018.
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tory. Indeed, the reading offered by the majority is impossible to square
with either the drafting process behind the statute or the comments made
in support of the provision.
The Court's opinions in both Hoffman and Nordic Village are cer-
tainly not textualist. The limitations that the Court placed on the lan-
guage of subsection (c) have no support in the text of the statute.
Instead, the Court engaged in an extreme form of dynamic interpreta-
tion. The Court crafted a policy designed to restrict claims against the
government whenever possible."'
The final bankruptcy case in which the Court failed to engage in textu-
alist analysis is Kelly v. Robinson."1 8 Kelly presented the issue of
whether a debtor who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy could discharge an
obligation to pay a criminal restitution order. In a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy, debtors surrender all of their assets to their creditors, except
those which the law "exempts." In exchange, debtors receive a discharge
of all "debts." Section 523(a) of the Code, however, contains restrictions
on this discharge. In particular, section 523(a)(7) provides that a debt is
not discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding if it stems from "a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is
not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
The debtor in Kelly was under a court order to repay the Connecticut
Department of Income Maintenance $6,000 based on the wrongful re-
ceipt of $10,000 in welfare benefits. The debtor argued that this obliga-
tion was discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding. The state made two
arguments in response to this contention: first, that the order of restitu-
tion was not a "debt" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, and
thus not discharged; and second, that if the restitution order was a debt,
it was removed from the scope of discharge by section 523(a)(7). The
Supreme Court agreed with this latter argument and held that section
523(a)(7) excluded the restitution order from discharge.
The Court's analysis began not with the language of the text, but with
the law's treatment of restitution obligations before the passage of the
Code." 9 Even though the language of the Bankruptcy Act appeared to
discharge restitution orders, courts had found such obligations nondis-
117. A full discussion of the merits of this policy is beyond the scope of this article. For an
insightful analysis of the Court's recent trend toward super-clear statement rules, see Eskridge and
Frickey, supra note 110.
118. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).




chargeable. Thus, the Court concluded that "Congress enacted the Code
in 1978 against the background of an established judicial exception to
discharge for criminal sentences, including restitution orders." 120 The
Court then turned to policy considerations. It noted that federal law as a
general matter respects state criminal law decisions. This being the case,
the Court did "not think Congress lightly would limit the rehabilitative
and deterrent options available to state criminal judges.... This reflec-
tion of our federalism also must influence our interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in this case." '21
Only after canvassing these policy considerations-which did not in-
dlude bankruptcy policy-did the Court in Kelly turn to the language of
the Bankruptcy Code. The Court did not decide whether the term
"debt" encompassed restitution orders, but expressed doubt that it
did.122 Turning to section 523(a)(7), the Court found its language "sub-
ject to interpretation." 2 3 The monies paid under a restitution order are
clearly paid to the state (although then turned over to the victim), and
the Court held that the payment was for the "benefit" of the state be-
cause the restitution order served a penal function. 24 Finally, the Court
held that the restitution payments were "not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss '1n 25 because the state court judge in imposing the restitu-
tion order had the discretion to order restitution of less than the full
amount of the injury. 126
Justice Marshall's dissent, which was joined by Justice Stevens, char-
acterized the majority's reading of the statutory text as strained at best.
Justice Marshall noted that the Connecticut statute authorizing restitu-
tion states that one purpose of the restitution order is to compensate the
injured party for the loss it suffered. 127 Thus, he argued that the order
seemed to fall outside the sweep of section 523(a)(7). As to the preban-
kruptcy practice on which the Court relied, Justice Marshall noted that
Congress codified the appropriate scope of discharge for penal orders in
120. Id. at 46.
121. Id. at 49.
122. Id. at 50. Despite these doubts, the Court later held that restitution orders are in fact
"debts" under the Code. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552
(1990).
123. 479 U.S. at 50.
124. Id. at 51-53.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988).
126. 479 U.S. at 53.
127. Id. at 55-56.
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section 523(a)(7), and that the Court should follow the language of that
codification.1 28
The Supreme Court's decision in Kelly is a dynamic one which focuses
on the policy of federalism. Had the Supreme Court in Kelly engaged in
a textualist approach, it would have reached the opposite result. Section
527(a)(7) removes from the scope of discharge debts which, among other
things, are "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." The theory of
restitution is that it restores what the wrongdoer has taken. That the
judge has the discretion to issue an order to restore less than the amount
taken-the point seized on by the majority in Kelly-does not make the
monies to be paid any less compensatory. Few would assert that com-
pensation necessarily means only full compensation. An order for partial
compensation is still compensatory. Therefore, had the Court engaged in
its standard textualist approach in Kelly, it would have reached the op-
posite conclusion.
Thus, in three of the four times that the Court departed from textual-
ism in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, it did so to further what it
viewed as important governmental interests. The Court's devotion to
governmental interests is also evinced by its practice in deciding which
bankruptcy cases to review. Nineteen of the cases in the sample came to
the Court after the courts of appeals were split on the issue. The Court
took another case to resolve a split among the bankruptcy courts,129 and
Nordic Village resolved an issue that had split the Court itself in Hoff-
man. Putting these two cases together with the nineteen circuit splits,
twenty-one of the twenty-four cases were reviewed to clear up uncer-
tainty in the law.130 In only three cases did the Court grant review in the
absence of a split in the lower courts or its own opinions. The petitioning
party in each of those three cases was the government. In two of these
cases, the federal government was the petitioning party;. 3 in the final
case it was a state government. 132 Not only was the government seeking
review in all of these cases, it prevailed on the merits in all of them.
Thus, while private parties must wait for a circuit split to have the
Supreme Court review an issue involving the interpretation of bank-
128. Id. at 58.
129. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
130. Thus, 87.5% of the cases involved a split among the circuits or members of the court.
131. See MCorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991); Holywell
Corp v. Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992).




ruptcy law, the government has ready access to the Court when it feels
aggrieved by an appellate court decision. This finding comports with the
Court's willingness to ignore textualism to further governmental
interests.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court is a puppet of the govern-
ment. The government has lost bankruptcy cases in the Court. 133
Rather, the Court has identified certain interests-sovereign immunity,
federalism, and the need for access to the Court-and these interests,
when they are present, drive the Court's results. The court jettisons tex-
tualism when such an approach would encroach on what the Court views
as the government's vital interests.
This concern for governmental interests directly conflicts with the
proffered justifications for textualism. One normative justification propo-
nents offer for textualism is that only the text of the statute has gone
through the constitutionally prescribed law making process.1 34 Other
considerations which might affect the analysis, such as legislative history
or general policy considerations, have not. This is true, however, regard-
less of whether the law in question touches on governmental interests.
Moreover, other parts of the Constitution, such as the Eleventh Amend-
ment, provide express protection for governmental interests. Conse-
quently, there seems to be little reason to abandon a practice supposedly
mandated by Article I to protect judicially created governmental inter-
ests. 135 In other words, the Court double counts. The general textualist
practice protects structural concerns, but these concerns are augmented
when a governmental interest is involved. Textualism, as the Court prac-
tices it, is thus justified as protecting governmental interests. Neverthe-
less, textualism is jettisoned when it is seen as impinging on other
governmental interests.
A second justification for textualism comes from public choice the-
ory. 136 Public choice scholars view legislation as the product of tradeoffs
133. The government was the losing party in United States v. Energy Resources, Co., 495 U.S.
545 (1990), and filed an amicus brief in support of the position that was rejected in United Say. Ass'n
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
134. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Zeppos,
Scalia's Textualism, supra note 1, at 1616-17; Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1300-04.
135. Eskridge and Frickey argue that the best possible defense for the Court's super-clear state-
ment rules, such as that invoked in Hoffman and Nordic Village, is that they protect constitutional
norms which are either unenforced or underenforced. See Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 110, at
629-32. However, they ultimately reject this justification. See id. at 632-45.
136. See Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 1, at 1617.
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among interest groups. They imply from this the proposition that courts
should only give interest groups the deals that they were able to place in
the statutory language. To do otherwise would make it easier for special
interests to gain results which do not promote the public interest. Thus,
the public interest is furthered by following statutory text. Yet if this is
the case, one would think that the government would not deserve the
special protection implicit in the Court's departure from textualism.
Congress is comprised of representatives from the states, and the federal
government has ready access to the lawmaking process. The government
thus has the ability to protect itself. To the extent that statutory lan-
guage disfavors governmental interests, this simply means that Congress
decided that such interests should give way. The government is not the
type of entity which tends to be exploited by legislative action. Thus, the
Court's overriding concern with governmental interests conflicts with the
proffered reasons for its textualist approach.
The Court's blatant desire to further governmental interests also con-
flicts with the textualist argument that following statutory language is
necessary to cabin judicial discretion. The Court's decisions in Hoffman,
Nordic Village, and Kelly are nothing more than judicial policy making.
While one may find the merits of these policies attractive, the inescapable
fact is that they are policies none the less. Thus, the Court's bankruptcy
cases reveal that the Court will follow textualism where it does not have
a strong commitment to a certain policy, but will abandon textualism
where a policy which it cares about is implicated. The Court's departure
from textualism robs textualism of much of its normative appeal. To the
extent that textualism is used as a normative theory of interpretation, it
has some appeal. 137 Yet, if the Court departs from textualism on occa-
sion, some other theory must explain the court's approach.' 3 Subpart
III(B) of this Article offers a pragmatic reason for the Court's use of
textualism in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.
B. The Pragmatic Case for the Supreme Court's Textualist Approach
to the Bankruptcy Code
The Supreme Court in deciding bankruptcy cases will occasionally de-
part from textualism to further certain policies that it deems important.
137. For a defense of textualism, see Schauer, Statutory Construction, supra note 1; Schauer,
Response, supra note 2; Easterbrook, Domains, supra note 2.
138. For a detailed explanation of why textualism cannot supply a foundational theory for statu-




Bankruptcy policy is not one them. Putting aside the four cases dis-
cussed in the previous section, in the twenty remaining bankruptcy cases,
the Court relied on the text of the statute before it, rather than on any
notion of bankruptcy policy, to reach its result.
This part of the Article argues that the Court's exclusive focus on stat-
utory text in the bankruptcy arena produces better results than would
obtain were the Court to embrace dynamic interpretation. The argument
proceeds as follows. First, the Article shows that the Court's current
practice is not in fact a faqade for actually promoting one view of bank-
ruptcy policy over another. The Article next shows that the outcome in
a majority of the Court's cases would have remained the same had the
Court used dynamic interpretation. As to those cases where the result
would have changed, the Article argues that the cost of these cases is
small so long as one does not a priori privilege one view of bankruptcy
over another. Moreover, given that the lower courts which implement
the Bankruptcy Code are often sensitive to bankruptcy policy, it is un-
likely that the Court's failure to consider bankruptcy policy would often
lead to results which have no basis in some conception of bankruptcy
policy. Against these relatively small costs, there is the benefit that the
Court can provide greater certainty in the law. Thus, from a pragmatic
standpoint, the Court should continue on its textualist course in inter-
preting the Bankruptcy Code.
1. The Irrelevance of Bankruptcy Policy in the Supreme Court
Not only does the Court fail to rely on bankruptcy policy expressly in
any of its opinions, but it also is readily apparent that the Court's textual-
ist approach is not a mask for a "hidden agenda" in the bankruptcy area.
The Court reaches results that are not universally consistent with any
theory of bankruptcy law. Some results comport with the economic ac-
count of bankruptcy law, while others coincide with the traditional
explanation.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decisions in United Sav-
ings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates"9 and United States v.
Ron Pair Enterprises." Timbers addressed the treatment of a secured
creditor whose collateral is worth less than the debt it is owed. The
Bankruptcy Code gives such a creditor two claims: a secured one for the
139. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
140. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
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amount of the collateral, and an unsecured one for the remainder of the
debt. 4 ' The Code does not allow interest to accrue on these claims. 142
For example, if a creditor is owed $10,000, and its debt is backed by
collateral worth $8,000 when the bankruptcy petition is filed, the creditor
would have a secured claim for $8,000 and an unsecured claim for
$2,000. At the end of the bankruptcy proceeding, secured claims are
paid in full, 43 and unsecured claims share pro rata in the remaining as-
sets.'" At issue in Timbers was treatment of the secured claim during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.
The Bankruptcy Code allows the holder of the secured claim to re-
quest "adequate protection of [its] interest in property" during the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 145 If the debtor fails to provide such protection, the
bankruptcy court will allow the creditor to foreclose on the collateral.146
The Code does not define what constitutes "adequate protection"; rather,
it provides three examples of the way in which a Court may provide such
protection. 47 The third of these is "relief... as will result in the realiza-
tion by [the creditor] of the indubitable equivalent of [its] interest."' 148
All agree that to the extent that the creditor's collateral is declining in
value, adequate protection requires that the secured creditor be compen-
sated for this decline. So if in the preceding example the collateral's
value was decreasing by $100 a month, the creditor, after asking for ade-
quate protection, would either be compensated for this loss or allowed to
foreclose on the collateral.
The fighting issue in Timbers was whether the undersecured creditor
who asked for adequate protection was entitled to compensation for the
temporal depreciation of the value of its collateral as well as for the phys-
ical depreciation. Even if the value of the collateral is stable in nominal
dollars, it is depreciating in an economic sense. Recovering $8,000 today
is simply not the same as recovering $8,000 in two years. The under-
secured creditor in Timbers asserted that this decline in the value of its
claim must be offset through adequate protection. The Court, however,
141. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
142. See I1 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988) (no claim for unmatured interest). The only exception to
this is for creditors whose collateral exceeds the amount of the debt. See 11 § U.S.C. 506(b) (1988).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1988).
144. 11 U.S.C. 726.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988).
146. Id.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).




held that "adequate protection" did not protect the creditor from such
temporal depreciation.
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion, written by Justice Scalia,
was textualist. The Court began with the fact that what was to be pro-
tected under the statute was the creditor's "interest in property" of the
debtor. It admitted that the phrase "interest in property" was ambigu-
ous standing alone. 49 The Court concluded, however, that when the
Bankruptcy Code was read as a whole, it became clear that the secured
creditor should receive compensation only for physical depreciation.
The Court pointed to section 506(b), which grants an oversecured credi-
tor interest on its claim, and section 502(b)(2), which disallows postpeti-
tion interest in all other situations. The Court opined that compensating
the undersecured creditor for temporal depreciation would conflict with
this statutory scheme.150 The Court also asserted that protecting the un-
dersecured creditor against temporal depreciation would be inconsistent
with section 362(d)(2) of the Code, which allows a creditor to have the
stay lifted if the debtor has no equity in the collateral and the collateral is
not needed for an effective reorganization. According to the Court, al-
lowing the undersecured creditor to lift the stay for lack of adequate pro-
tection if he is not protected against temporal depreciation would allow
him to lift the stay when the debtor held no equity in the property even if
the property was necessary for the reorganization effort. Thus, the Court
reasoned, section 362(d)(2) would have no independent effect. 5 ' The
Court rejected the undersecured creditor's arguments which were based
on the legislative history of the Code.'52
The Court's decision might have changed had it engaged in dynamic
interpretation. Dynamic interpretation would begin with the frank ad-
mission that the text of the Code is ambiguous. The Court's textual ar-
guments are by no means compelling. The interest provision discusses
the general treatment of contractual interest. This treatment occurs an-
tomatically under the Code. Adequate protection, on the other hand,
has nothing to do with the terms of the contract and must be requested
by the creditor. The Court's concern that it might read section 362(d)(2)
out of the Code also fails to satisfy. Requiring the debtor to pay tempo-
ral depreciation as part of adequate protection would not allow the credi-
149. 484 U.S. at 371.
150. Id. at 371-73.
151. Id. at 374-76.
152. Id. at 379-80.
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tor to foreclose on the property whenever the debtor has no equity left in
the collateral. It would simply require the debtor to compensate the
creditor for such depreciation if the debtor is to prevent foreclosure.
Moreover, other textual sources suggest the conclusion rejected by the
court. The Code makes clear in section 1129 that the phrase "indubita-
ble equivalent" includes temporal depreciation.153 Finally, the legislative
history also fails to answer the question. Thus, a court employing dy-
namic interpretation would admit that the Code was ambiguous on this
point, and choose the interpretation that best furthered bankruptcy
policy.
From a policy perspective, the Court's result in Timbers is certainly
consistent with the traditional view of bankruptcy. This view exalts the
reorganization of financially troubled firms. The likelihood for a success-
ful reorganization is increased to the extent that debtors do not have to
pay money to creditors during the bankruptcy proceeding.154 More cash
on hand makes it easier for the corporation to meet current expenses,
which the corporation must do even though it has filed for bank-
ruptcy.1 55 Not compensating undersecured creditors for the temporal
depreciation of their collateral also gives those creditors an incentive to
work toward a quick reorganization. Taken together, these factors lead
to the conclusion that granting temporal depreciation would impede the
goal of furthering reorganizations.' 56
The holding in Timbers, however, conflicts with the economic account
of bankruptcy.' 57 In the reorganization context, the economic account
posits that it is the goal of bankruptcy law to ensure efficient deployment
of the firm's assets. If a single person owned all the assets of the firm,
that person would have the appropriate incentives to put the firm's assets
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
154. For an argument on this score, see Note, "Adequate Protection" and the Availability of
Postpetition Interest to Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1106 (1987).
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) (debtor may use, sell or lease property
in ordinary course of business during bankruptcy); 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988) (debtor may incur debt in
ordinary course); 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) (costs of running business receive priority status).
156. Note, supra note 154; Raymond T. Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay:
Variable Bargain Models of Fairness, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1983)
157. The normative argument is set forth in Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Corpo-
rate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984). The statutory argu-
ment for this position can be found in Thomas 0. Kelly III, Comment, Compensation for Time





to their highest valued use. A single owner bears the marginal cost of a
wrong decision and enjoys the marginal benefit of a correct one. How-
ever, if multiple owners of a firm exist, those making the deployment
decision will be concerned with their own return rather than the total
return to all of the owners of the firm. To overcome this divergence of
interests, reorganization law should attempt to place the decision making
authority in the party that bears both the marginal costs and benefits of
the decision. Unsecured creditors, who control the bankruptcy proceed-
ing to some extent, stand to realize the marginal gain by the efficient
deployment of the assets. Thus, unsecured creditors should bear the
marginal costs. Unsecured creditors will only bear these costs if they
compensate secured creditors for the true cost of delay-temporal and
physical depreciation. If unsecured creditors do not bear these costs,
they have an incentive to delay because such delay works a redistribution
from the secured creditors to themselves.
Timbers is thus a case in which the Court's textualist approach fur-
thers the traditional account of bankruptcy at the expense of the eco-
nomic account. The Court's decisions, however, do not always dovetail
with the results suggested by the traditional view of bankruptcy law.
Consider in this respect the Court's decision in United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises,158 which fortuitously corresponds with the economic rather
than the traditional account of bankruptcy law. Ron Pair held that a
nonconsensual oversecured creditor was entitled to postpetition interest
on its claim. Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an
oversecured creditor shall be allowed "interest on [its] claim, and any
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under
which [its] claim arose." '15 9 The interpretative issue before the Court was
whether the "agreement" establishing the claim must encompass the "in-
terest" that the creditor sought. If so, a nonconsensual secured credi-
tor-in this case the IRS, which had obtained a tax lien on the debtor's
property-would not be entitled to postpetition interest because, by defi-
nition, its secured claim is not based on an agreement between the par-
ties. A five member majority held that under the plain language of the
statute the oversecured creditor was entitled to interest; only fees, costs
and charges must be in the agreement if they are to be recovered. 160 The
dissent asserted that the majority's analysis rested solely on the comma
158. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
160. 489 U.S. at 241-43.
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between "interest" and "and," and that such punctuation should not
control the outcome of the case. The dissent would thus have looked to
pre-Code practice, under which interest was not recoverable in this type
of situation. 161
Ron Pair is like Timbers because the outcome that would have re-
sulted through the use of dynamic interpretation turns on whichever
view of bankruptcy policy one adopts. The dissent is correct that the
majority's reading turns on the existence of the comma between "inter-
est" and "and." Moreover, the legislative history makes no mention of
the appropriate treatment of oversecured nonconsensual creditors. These
traditional sources of statutory interpretation fail to present a compelling
case for one reading of the statute or the other. The outcome under a
dynamic approach would thus turn on which interpretation best pro-
moted the polices that bankruptcy advances.
The economic explanation of bankruptcy law would support the hold-
ing in Ron Pair. Outside of bankruptcy, there is no doubt that the over-
secured creditor is entitled to interest on its claim. There is no
bankruptcy reason to alter this result simply because a bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed. The need to overcome the collective action problem, which
drives the economic account of bankruptcy law, provides no basis to cur-
tail the rights of the oversecured nonconsensual creditor. Indeed, cur-
tailing such rights would give the debtor an incentive to file for
bankruptcy simply to take advantage of the rule change. Outside of
bankruptcy, the debtor would have to pay interest on the oversecured
claim; inside of bankruptcy it would not. To avoid this state of affairs,
the economic account suggests that all oversecured creditors should be
allowed postpetition interest.
This conclusion, however, conflicts with a practical reasoning ap-
proach based on the traditional view of bankruptcy law.162 As with Tim-
bers, the payment of money reduces the chance of having a plan of
reorganization confirmed. Moreover, because the creditor did not bar-
gain for the protection of excessive collateral, there is no countervailing
reason to allow the oversecured nonconsensual creditor interest on its
claim. The traditional account would respect creditors who in the bar-
gaining process took sufficient collateral to cover both their claims and
interest. Failing to do so might make it more difficult for the debtor to
161. Id. at 249-54.
162. See Tabb and Lawless, supra note 42, at 844 ("The Court's decision makes little sense in the




obtain credit in the first instance. Such concern, however, does not exist
with the nonconsensual creditor. Payments to such creditors simply re-
duce the funds available to other creditors. Thus, those advocating the
traditional view would deny nonconsensual oversecured creditors interest
under section 506(b).
Comparing Timbers and Ron Pair demonstrates the candor of the
Court's opinions. Whereas the result in Timbers favors the traditional
account at the expense of the economic account, the result in Ron Pair
comports with the economic account while conflicting with the tradi-
tional account. The upshot of these conflicting decisions is that one can-
not deem the Court's textualist approach a fagade for advancing one view
of bankruptcy policy over the other.
Furthermore, the Court's results in its bankruptcy cases do not con-
sistently favor one type of party over another. Sometimes creditors
win, 163 as they did in Ron Pair, sometimes they lose as they did in Tim-
bers.1" The results in these cases are best explained through reasoning
given by the Court. Therefore, we do not have to wonder whether the
Court speaks candidly in its opinions.1 65 It does.
The bottom line is that the Court cares little for bankruptcy policy.
While the perceived needs of the government force the Court to jettison
its textualist approach, bankruptcy policy-of either stripe--does not
rise to such a level. To say that the Court has a bankruptcy jurispru-
dence would thus be misleading; it has no jurisprudence at all in this
area.
2. The Pragmatic Case for Textualism in Bankruptcy Cases
The Court's failure to articulate a coherent bankruptcy policy does not
necessarily imply that one should condemn the Court's approach. In-
deed, this Article ultimately concludes that textualism is a superior strat-
egy for the Supreme Court in the context of the Bankruptcy Code.
Perhaps the largest difficulty in assessing the Court's performance in its
bankruptcy cases is determining the relevant baseline for measurement.
If one were to take fealty to the statutory language as the baseline, one
would reach a different conclusion than if one measured the Court's per-
163. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
164. See Timbers, 484 U.S. 365 (1988); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
165. On the dispute surrounding whether the Court should be candid in its analysis compare
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) with Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. L.J. 353 (1989).
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formance against the requirement of whether it articulated a coherent
bankruptcy policy. As with many areas of legal analysis, one's view of
the appropriate goal often drives the assessment of the current state of
affairs.
The baseline that I use in the Article is one set by the proponents of
dynamic interpretation. Namely, that one should measure the Court's
output against the results it produces. I select this baseline both because
I am a consequentialist and thus believe that all law should be measured
against the consequences that it produces, and also because this is the
stated goal of those who advocate a switch to dynamic interpretation. If
dynamic interpretation does not produce a gain over textualism when
measured by this criterion, then the case for such interpretation, at least
in the context of the Code, falls by its own weight.
In assessing the consequences of the Court's textualist approach, it is
necessary to ascertain the role which the Court plays in the administra-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code. This is a function both of the Court's own
opinions, and the impact that these opinions have on the judicial admin-
istration of the Code. The fact that one must assess the impact of the
Court's own decisions is hardly a novel proposition. What is often over-
looked, however, is that the Court does not implement statutes autono-
mously. Rather, it operates in a hierarchical structure. In the case of the
Code, the Court shares implementation duties with appellate courts, dis-
trict courts, and bankruptcy courts. Only by situating the Court within
this hierarchy can one assess the true impact of its decisions in the bank-
ruptcy area.
166
When one examines the Court's bankruptcy cases, it becomes readily
apparent that the Court plays a systemic role in the implementation of
the Bankruptcy Code. The Court does not act as an institution which
attempts to delineate a coherent bankruptcy policy. Unlike other statu-
tory areas, such as civil rights, where the Court delves into the policy
behind the statute, 167 the Court in bankruptcy pays no attention to the
policies which animate bankruptcy law. This is not to say, however, that
the Court plays no coherent role in this area of the law. The Court does
166. Professor Eskridge has also recently noted the common failure to situate the Court in its
role in the judicial hierarchy in assessing its results. See ESKRIDGE, JURISPRUDENCE, Ch. 2.
167. See, eg., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) ("[W]e must
determine whether the reasons that support the use of disparate impact analysis apply to subjective





play an important role because it provides certainty to the system. The
Court's major function is to resolve circuit splits. Recall that 87.5% of
the cases in the survey-those not involving a governmental interest-
came to the Court to resolve some sort of split in the law. 168 Thus, when
the Court is not faced with a governmental interest, it has adopted a
procedural rather than substantive role. The Court intervenes only when
confusion in the law exists. The Court resolves this confusion without
any attention to bankruptcy policy. The unavoidable conclusion is that
the Court is much more concerned with ensuring uniformity in the im-
plementation of federal bankruptcy law than with the content of such
law.
The Court itself in United States v. Energy Resources169 signalled its
desire to leave the crafting of substantive bankruptcy law to the lower
courts. Like Begier, 7 Energy Resources involved trust fund taxes. The
debtor in Energy Resources owed both trust fund and nontrust fund taxes
when it filed for bankruptcy. As required by the Bankruptcy Code, the
debtor's plan of reorganization provided that the debtor would pay all of
these taxes in full during the next six years.' 7 1 The plan also provided
that the payments would be credited to the trust fund portion of the
unpaid taxes first. The IRS objected to this provision. Corporate officers
are personally liable for the payment of trust fund taxes, and the IRS
desired to keep the officers as a potential source of payment for as long as
possible.
The Bankruptcy Code does not address the ordering problem. The
Court in holding that bankruptcy judges have the power to designate the
allocation of the payments pointed to two provisions of the Code-sec-
tion 1123(b)(5), which allows a plan to contain "any . . .appropriate
provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,"
and section 105(a), which empowers the bankruptcy court to "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary to carry out the provisions
of this title." According to the Court, "[t]hese statutory directives are
consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as
courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relation-
ships."' 72 In other words, the Court was more than happy to leave the
168. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
169. 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
170. For a discussion of Begier, see supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988).
172. 495 U.S. at 549.
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matter to the discretion of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court,
not the Supreme Court, could decide whether or not allowing the pay-
ment of trust fund taxes first was consistent with bankruptcy policy.
To determine whether the consequences of the Supreme Court adopt-
ing its procedural role in the implementation of the Bankruptcy Code are
beneficial, one must contrast this role to that proposed by the advocates
of dynamic interpretation. Those who wish to see the Court take what
they view as a more overtly dynamic approach to statutory construction
assert that the Court's job is to further public policy consistent with the
text and history of the statute. The Court under this theory, upon find-
ing no answer in the statute or legislative history, should "examine the
consequences of giving the invoker [of the statute] what he wants and
then estimate whether those consequences will on the whole be good
ones." '173 The first question to be addressed is what benefits would be
gained from a shift to dynamic interpretation. After examining any pol-
icy gains attributable to a shift to dynamic interpretation, this Article
examines the costs inherent in the Court's shifting role in the hierarchical
structure from a procedural to a substantive one.
a. The Limited Gains From Adopting Dynamic Interpretation
Proponents of dynamic interpretation assert that adoption of such a
practice would lead to decisions that better effectuated public policy.
The gain, however, does not seem as large as that suggested by dynamic
theorists. Most of the cases which the Court has handled, like Farrey v.
Sanderfoot,174 would have come out the same way had the Court en-
gaged in dynamic interpretation and embraced either vision of bank-
ruptcy policy. Of the Court's twenty textualist bankruptcy opinions, the
decision would have remained the same under a dynamic approach in
fourteen of them regardless of which view of bankruptcy policy was
adopted. Only two of these twenty cases would have reached a different
result had the Court used dynamic interpretation in conjunction with
either view of bankruptcy policy. 175 One case would have been decided
differently had the Court used practical reasoning and embraced the eco-
173. Posner, supra note 2, at 300.
174. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991). For a discussion of Farrey, see supra notes 25-41 and accompany-
ing text.





nomic account of bankruptcy, 17 6 and three cases might have had differ-
ent outcomes had the Court used practical reasoning with a focus on the
traditional account of bankruptcy. 77 Accordingly, 70% of the cases
would have come out the same way had the Court practiced dynamic
interpretation, 10% would have come out differently, and 20% may have
come out differently depending on the factors which the Court viewed as
relevant under a practical reasoning approach. Given that the Court
would ultimately decide either one or three of the cases in the last cate-
gory the same under practical reasoning, the Court, at worst, reached
the same result using its textualist approach as it would have if it had
used a dynamic approach in 75% of the cases.
Nevertheless, a number of cases would have come out differently had
the Court used dynamic interpretation. The proponents of dynamic in-
terpretation might suggest that any improvement over the current system
would argue for a change in interpretative focus. After all, a small gain
is better than no gain at all. To assess this claim, it is first necessary to
determine the benefits in terms of bankruptcy policy that would result.
Only two cases would have been decided differently regardless of the
bankruptcy policy endorsed by a dynamic approach. These cases are
Toibb v. Radloff.7 . and Johnson v. Home State Bank. 7 9 Both deal with
access to certain chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. When the practical
import of these cases are examined, it becomes clear that the benefits to
bankruptcy policy of changing both decisions would be trivial.
In Toibb v. Radloff,8 0 the Supreme Court decided that an individual
debtor who was not engaged in business could file for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court argued that "the
plain language of the Bankruptcy Code disposes of the question before
us."'' Section 109 provides that, with exceptions not relevant in Toibb,
a "person" eligible to file for Chapter 7 can file for Chapter 11. "Person"
is defined in the Code, and a "person" who can file for Chapter 7 un-
doubtedly includes an individual. Given that the Code does exclude
some entities that are "persons" under the Code from filing for Chapter
7, and thus Chapter 11 as well, the Court declined to exclude any indi-
176. See Timbers, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
177. See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); and MCorp v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
178. 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
179. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
180. 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
181. Id.
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viduals from filing for Chapter 11 even though Toibb had no on-going
business. The Court's decision is thus an illustration of the familiar ex-
pressio unis principle. The Court rejected the lower court's reliance on
the Code's legislative history as limiting Chapter 11 relief to those en-
gaged in a business. The Court first noted that legislative history could
not displace a clear text. It then suggested that the legislative history was
not clear on the point. The Court also rejected the proffered policy argu-
ments for keeping those without businesses from reorganizing under
Chapter 11.
Justice Stevens dissented. He admitted the "plausib[ility]" of the ma-
jority's argument, but concluded that "[w]hen the statute is read as a
whole.., it seems quite clear that Congress did not intend to authorize a
'reorganization' of the affairs of an individual consumer debtor."' 82 Jus-
tice Stevens found section 109 unclear as to whether it merely excluded
those not eligible for Chapter 7 relief from filing for Chapter 11 or
whether it affirmatively authorized all those eligible for Chapter 7 to file
for Chapter 11 as well. He then examined the Code's legislative history,
which "convince[d him] that consumer debtors may not avail themselves
of Chapter 11. "183
The truth of the matter is that few people, if any, thought of this issue
when the Bankruptcy Code was drafted. A court using dynamic inter-
pretation would admit this fact and then examine the policy implications
of its decision. Certainly, Chapter 11 was not drafted with the case of the
individual consumer debtor in mind. For most persons, Chapter 13 pro-
vides greater relief than Chapter 11. However, as in Toibb, an individual
may desire to file to under Chapter 11 when he cannot qualify for relief
under Chapter 13.184 In such a situation, a Chapter 11 plan of reorgani-
zation is the only way for an individual to retain his nonexempt assets.
From an economic point of view, there is little reason to keep the assets
of a debtor together if the debtor is not engaged in an ongoing business.
The rationale for the existence of Chapter 11 simply has no place in this
context. Moreover, it is difficult to think of an argument based on tradi-
tional bankruptcy policy which would allow consumer debtors to file for
Chapter 11 because the traditional justification for Chapter 11 is to save
financially troubled firms.
Although Toibb is wrongly decided, the cost of this decision is un-
182. Id. at 2202.
183. Id. at 2202-03.




doubtedly quite small. A nonbusiness debtor will rarely benefit from
proceeding under Chapter 11. Debtors who can qualify for Chapter 13
prefer to file under that provision. As to those nonbusiness debtors un-
able to file for Chapter 13, Chapter 11 offers little benefit over Chapter 7.
Most importantly, the discharge granted in Chapter 11 does not extend
to debtors that do not engage in business after confirmation of the plan of
reorganization. 8 5 Thus, the debtor still owes all of its prebankruptcy
debts. Consequently, it is highly doubtful that Toibb will open the flood-
gates to a significant number of Chapter 11 cases. Added to this is the
Chapter 11 requirement that a creditor receive at least as much under a
plan of reorganization as it would have under a Chapter 7 liquidation.186
This qualification suggests that the loss to creditors associated with al-
lowing nonbusiness debtors to fie for Chapter 11 is quite small. While
Toibb is thus wrongly decided from the perspective of dynamic interpre-
tation, the cost of this error is, at worst, minimal.
The second case in which the Court's decision would change under
dynamic interpretation is Johnson v. Home State Bank. 87 In this case
the Court addressed the propriety of so-called "Chapter 20" bankrupt-
cies. These bankruptcies occur when an individual debtor who owns
mortgaged property first ifies a Chapter 7 petition. The Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding discharges the individual's personal liability on the debt obliga-
tion, thus leaving the mortgage holder only with a lien on the property
itself.188 After the Chapter 7 proceeding ends, the debtor immediately
files for Chapter 13 before the lien holder can foreclose on the property.
In the Chapter 13 proceeding, the debtor proposes a plan to pay the
mortgage over time. The net effect of this maneuver is an unconsented
rescheduling of the mortgage and a loss of individual liability on the
debt.
The Court viewed Johnson as presenting the question whether the
mortgage holder's lien on the property in the subsequent Chapter 13 pro-
ceeding constituted a "claim" against the debtor after the debtor's per-
sonal liability was discharged. Only a "claim" can be rescheduled under
Chapter 13. Relying on its statement in Pennsylvania Department of
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(B) (1988).
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
187. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
188. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988) (discharge of personal liability). The doctrine of a lien "passing
through" bankruptcy was first enunciated in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
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Public Welfare v. Davenport189 that a "'right to payment' [means] noth-
ing more nor less than an enforceable obligation,"' 190 the Court had "no
trouble concluding that a mortgage interest that survives the discharge of
a debtor's personal liability is a 'claim.' "191 The Court noted that this
textualist conclusion was buttressed by other sections of the Code and
confirmed by the Code's legislative history. The Court rejected the mort-
gage holder's claim that serial filings allowed the debtor to escape the
limits that Congress placed on the remedies available in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 respectively. The Court based its rejection on the ground
that the Code expressly prohibits certain serial filings, but not the combi-
nation at issue here.
If the Court had used a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation
in Johnson, it would have likely reached a different result. The Code
neither authorizes nor prohibits Chapter 20 bankruptcies. The legislative
history suggests that Congress viewed Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 as alter-
native remedies. This distinction makes sense from the standpoint of
bankruptcy policy, both economic and traditional. 192 The core notion of
Chapter 7 is that the debtor surrenders all nonexempt assets in exchange
for a discharge of her past unsecured debts; the debtor thus keeps all of
her future income. The core notion of Chapter 13 is that the debtor
keeps current assets in exchange for a promise to devote her future dis-
posable income for a period of years to pay her past debts. Neither pur-
pose suggests that the debtor should be able to combine these alternate
schemes so as to turn a recourse loan into a nonrecourse loan and alter
the payment schedule.
Moreover, the effect of the maneuver in Johnson is to evade the limita-
tions which Congress placed on Chapter 13. The Bankruptcy Code al-
lows debtors to file for Chapter 13 only if they have unsecured debts of
less than $100,000 and secured debts of less than $350,000.'93 The
debtor in Johnson could not have filed for Chapter 13 initially because
his debts exceeded these limitations. The Court, however, approved this
end run around the Chapter 13 limitations despite the fact that such ac-
tion comports with neither view of appropriate bankruptcy policy.
189. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
190. 111 S. Ct. at 2154 (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552,
559 (1990)). The bracketed language was added by the Court in Johnson.
191. 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
192. For a traditionalist's disagreement with Johnson, see Tabb and Lawless, supra note 42, at
875-77.




The cost of the Court's decision in Johnson is somewhat higher than
the cost of its decision in Toibb, but still not substantial. Recall that
Johnson approved a debtor's filing for Chapter 13 immediately after the
debtor had completed a Chapter 7 proceeding. Johnson thus allows some
debtors to file for Chapter 13 who otherwise would have been forced to
live with the results of their prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Because the
initial Chapter 7 proceeding cannot lower the amount of secured debt, it
allows those debtors who meet the secured debt limitation on Chapter 13
but not the unsecured debt limitation on that provision to eventually file
for Chapter 13. Thus, Johnson will lead to more debtors filing for Chap-
ter 13 than would otherwise be the case. This increase in the number of
debtors in Chapter 13 will only be a cost to the extent that Chapter 13
itself imposes some type of unwanted costs. Chapter 13 allows a debtor
to keep nonexempt assets in exchange for a promise to pay creditors the
value of such assets. 194 If the bankruptcy judge imposes a low interest
rate in computing future payments, this ability may benefit debtors at the
expense of creditors. The judge must discount future payments to pres-
ent value to ensure that the creditor is receiving the value of its claim. If
too low an interest rate is used, the creditor will end up receiving less
than the present value of its claim. In this way, Chapter 13 may benefit
debtors. Such a problem would not arise in the Chapter 20 context, how-
ever, because the debtor has already surrendered all nonexempt assets in
the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
A second benefit of Chapter 13 deals with that provision's effect upon
secured claims. Chapter 13 allows debtors to keep the collateral in ex-
change for promising creditors that they will pay the creditors the pres-
ent value of the collateral over the life of their Chapter 13 plan.195 This
plan may last at the longest five years. 196 To keep collateral in a Chapter
7 proceeding, on the other hand, the debtor must either reaffirm the un-
derlying obligation, thus promising to pay the creditor's entire claim re-
gardless of the value of the collateral, or the debtor must pay the creditor
the value of the collateral immediately. 197 By filing for a Chapter 13, the
debtor receives the benefit of judicial valuation of the property, and the
opportunity to pay this valuation over time. Johnson allows some debt-
ors who do not meet the eligibility requirements for Chapter 13 to garner
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(b)(ii) (1988).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988).
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this benefit for themselves. To the extent that errors in the valuation
process result in undercompensated creditors, this is a cost of Johnson.
The cost, however, appears relatively small. Few debtors meet only the
secured (but not the unsecured) claim limits.
Moreover, the valuations probably do not have a wide variance. The
maximum amount of secured claims that a debtor may have and still be
able to file for Chapter 13 is $350,000. It seems unlikely that there would
be substantial variations in valuing what is ultimately relatively small
inexpensive collateral. Most of the collateral at issue would be land. 98
While there will be room for judicial judgement in this context, the feasi-
ble valuations should fall in a fairly narrow range.
Thus, while Toibb and Johnson were both decided wrongly from the
perspective of dynamic interpretation, the costs of these decisions are rel-
atively trivial.
Four other cases might have changed if the Court had engaged in dy-
namic interpretation rather than its textualist approach. Whether the
actual results in these cases represent costs of the Court's current inter-
pretive practice depends upon one's view of bankruptcy policy. If one
views the economic account of bankruptcy as best identifying appropri-
ate bankruptcy policy, then one would consider Timbers wrongly de-
cided. Timbers is a major case, perhaps the most important of the
Court's decisions. The cost of the Timbers opinion is that it raises the
cost of credit to those seeking to borrow money.19 9 Creditors who take
collateral know that as a result of Timbers they will not be compensated
for the delay caused by bankruptcy if their collateral is less than the
amount of their claim. Thus, creditors will charge the debtor a higher
interest rate in the first instance.2"°
Of course, from the traditional perspective, the cost imposed on debt-
ors by Timbers is outweighed by the promotion of reorganizations. Giv-
ing less cash to the undersecured creditors leaves more assets in the
control of the debtor. A debtor may use these assets to fund its contin-
ued operation while it attempts to formulate a plan of reorganization.
198. A debtor could not use Chapter 20 to modify the debt on her house because Chapter 13
does not allow for the modification of residential mortgages. See 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2); Nobelman v.
American Savings Bank, 61 U.S.L.W. 4531 (1993).
199. I discuss the relationship between bankruptcy law and the cost of credit at length in Ras-
mussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 10, at 56-58.





Moreover, the secured creditor has incentive to agree to a reorganization
plan because it is not compensated for the delay caused by the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Before discussing how to evaluate cases such as
Timbers in which the assessment of the result turns on one's view of
bankruptcy policy, consider the other cases which have this same feature.
The result in three of the Supreme Court's bankruptcy cases would
have changed if the Court had used dynamic interpretation and em-
braced the traditional view of bankruptcy policy. These cases are Ron
Pair, MCorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,2"' and
Dewsnup v. Timm .' The Court in Ron Pair gave more to oversecured
nonconsensual creditors, and thus reduced the probability of reorganiza-
tion plan confirmation. The less money the debtor can commit to the
reorganization plan, the less likely it is that the debtor's creditors will
accept such a plan. The overall effect of this decision depends to a large
extent on the number of oversecured nonconsensual creditors that appear
in bankruptcy. My sense is that this number is relatively small. The
largest creditor in this category is the IRS. The IRS obtains a lien upon
all of the debtor's property upon the debtor's failure to pay taxes.2 °3
However, the lien will only be effective in bankruptcy if the government
has perfected it through filing.2 4 Thus, for the government to be an
oversecured creditor in bankruptcy, it must before bankruptcy learn of
the nonpayment of taxes, and take affirmative action to perfect the lien at
a time when the debtor's unencumbered assets exceed the amount of its
claim. Such actions are unlikely to occur in a high percentage of cases.
The effect of Ron Pair thus is not large. Certainly, it is not nearly as
large as the effect of Timbers.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in MCorp does not appear to
impose large costs from the perspective of the traditional view of bank-
ruptcy law. The Court in MCorp held that section 362 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which automatically stays most collection efforts against a
debtor, did not stay ongoing administrative proceedings by the Federal
Reserve Board investigating MCorp's financial transactions. Section
362(a) stays many actions against the debtor. Section 362(b)(4), how-
ever, exempts actions "by a governmental unit to enforce such govern-
mental unit's police or regulatory power." The Court held that the
201. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
202. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
203. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988).
204. 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1988).
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Board's actions "[fell] squarely within" this exception.20 5 The Court's
unanimous opinion also rejected MCorp's argument that the bankruptcy
court had to decide whether the exercise of regulatory power was legiti-
mate because such a reading of the statute would conflict with agency
discretion and be inconsistent with the limited authority Congress has
granted bankruptcy courts.
The Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion had it
used a dynamic approach informed by the economic account of bank-
ruptcy law. The statutory language is clear, and under the economic
account of bankruptcy, the general justification for staying nonban-
kruptey decision-making processes and deciding all claims against debt-
ors in a single forum is efficiency.20 6 It is cheaper to resolve the many
claims against the debtor all at once. Moreover, there is no reason to
think that the bankruptcy court cannot replicate the judicial proceedings
that otherwise would have occurred. This justification does not hold
where, as in the case of administrative agencies, the bankruptcy court is
institutionally incompetent to serve as a substitute for the nonbankruptcy
forum.20 7 A court is a fundamentally different decisionmaking body than
an administrative agency. Dynamic interpretation coupled with the eco-
nomic account of bankruptcy would thus allow administrative proceed-
ings to continue despite the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
If the Court used dynamic interpretation in conjunction with the tradi-
tional account of bankruptcy law, however, MCorp might have come out
the other way. To cabin the capacious language of the Bankruptcy Code,
one could point to legislative history which indicates that section
362(b)(4) is to be given a narrow construction so as to apply only to
government actions that "protect the public health and safety."2 Many
lower courts have relied on this history to narrow the reach of section
362(b)(4)'s broad language.2 "9 They use this legislative history to con-
clude the administrative actions should be allowed to go forward only
205. 112 S. Ct. at 464.
206. See Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 73, 85 (1985); Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1567, 1575-76 (1991).
207. See Rasmussen, supra note 207.
208. See 124 CONG. REc. S17,406 (daily ed. Oct 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 124
CONG. REc. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
209. See, eg., Missouri v. United States Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768, 775-77 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); EEOC v. Hall's Motor Transit Co, 789 F.2d 1011, 1013-14 (3d Cir.




when such actions are designed to further public policy rather than to
protect the government's pecuniary interest. The traditional account
would posit that as a policy matter it is preferable to have a bankruptcy
court decide as many issues as possible so that the bankruptcy judge can
ensure that the goal of securing an effective reorganization is not slighted.
Because most administrative actions do promote public policy, they
would not be stayed. Indeed, while the district court in MCorp con-
cluded that the action by the Federal Reserve was stayed because the
action was designed to promote the government's pecuniary interest, the
court of appeals did not rule on the issue. It is not too much of a stretch
to characterize the action at issue as one in furtherance of public policy.
Thus, while MCorp did not recognize the limits on the exception from
the automatic stay advocated by those from the traditional school of
bankruptcy, the practical effect of the Court's failure to do so may be
quite small. Many administrative actions clearly would not be stayed.
As for the rest, such as the proceeding in MCorp, it is unclear whether or
not the action would be stayed.
Finally, the Court's decision in Dewsnup again applies to a limited
class of cases.210 The Court in Dewsnup addressed the question whether
section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to "strip down" a
lien. In Dewsnup, the creditor, Timm, loaned the Dewsnups $119,000.
The loan was secured by a lien on two pieces of real estate owned by the
Dewsnups. The Dewsnups defaulted on the loan and filed for bank-
ruptcy. After a trial, the bankruptcy court concluded that the land se-
curing the loan was worth $39,000. The Dewsnups invoked subsection
506(d) in order to reduce the amount of Timm's lien to the value of the
collateral.
Section 506(d) provides that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void
.... ,21 The Court held that this provision did not allow for strip down.
The Court noted that the statutory language was ambiguous and there-
fore could be read either as allowing strip down whenever a claim ex-
ceeded the value of the collateral, as the Dewsnups argued, or allowing
210. Professor Howard has noted the harms which could occur if Dewsnup where extended
beyond the situation before the Court. See Margret Howard, Dewsnupping The Bankruptcy Code, 1
J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 513, 517-24 (1992). The Court was careful to leave these problems for another
day. See 112 S. Ct. at 778 ("We. .. focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their
legal resolution on another day.").
211. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
584 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
strip down only if the claim at issue was disallowed, as Timm and the
Department of Justice, appearing as amicus curiae, argued. Given this
ambiguity, the Court turned to pre-Code practice, and disallowed strip
down. I consider this to be a textualist result. Justice Blackmun first
read the text of the statute, and when this was not plain, he invoked a
canon of construction to decide the issue.21 2
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. For Justice Scalia,
there was no ambiguity in the statutory text. He read the section as al-
lowing strip down. He opined that the alternative reading adopted by
the Court would make the word "secured" in section 506(d) redundant,
and would also be contrary to the use of the term "allowed secured
claim" in other parts of the Code.
Neither the majority nor the dissent employed dynamic interpretation
in reaching its result. Such an approach would candidly admit the am-
biguous nature of section 506(d), and look to the policy consequences of
the decision at hand. Followers of the economic view of bankruptcy
would first note that the principal effect of reading section 506(d) to al-
low strip down would be to allow the debtor to capture any increase in
the value of the property occurring after stripdown but before the prop-
erty was sold. Moreover, such a reading would give the debtor the bene-
fit of a judicial valuation of the property. Even if judges were unbiased in
the direction of their inevitable errors, bias in favor of debtors would be
the actual result. If a debtor does not agree with the judge's valuation,
the debtor can still have the foreclosure sale. On the other hand, if the
creditor believes that the valuation is low, it has no remedy; it is stuck
with that valuation. Finally, combining the strip down interpretation
with the result in Johnson,213 which approved the filing of a Chapter 13
bankruptcy immediately after the debtor had completed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, a debtor could use Chapter 7 to discharge personal liability
on the claim and strip down the lien to the value of the collateral, and
212. I do not mean to imply that using canons of construction necessarily mean that an opinion
is textualist. For example, Cass Sunstein has offered a set of cannons which embody normative
policy judgments. See Sunstein, supra note 2. Nevertheless, textualists also rely on canons of con-
struction. The difference between dynamic interpretation and textualism is not that one uses canons
and the other does not; rather, it is the substance of the canons themselves. Dynamic canons are
self-consciously normative. They are designed to implement certain policies. Textualist canons, on
the other hand, purport to be common sense rules of interpretation rather than policy judgments.
The cannon invoked by Justice Blackmun in Dewsnup is a textualist canon.




then file for Chapter 13 and reschedule the payments on the reduced lien.
There is little reason to suggest that any of these effects is efficient.
A practical reasoning approach relying on traditional bankruptcy pol-
icy would reach a contrary result.2" 4 Under this view, strip down simply
replicates state law foreclosure proceedings-the creditor is left with the
value of the collateral. Moreover, allowing strip down precludes the
creditor from extracting from the debtor any subjective value which the
debtor attaches to the property. At an actual foreclosure sale, the credi-
tor can bid in its claim even though this claim exceeds the value of the
collateral. Because the creditor does not have to put any new money on
the table, it can force the bidding beyond the market price of the collat-
eral up to the subjective value which the debtor attaches to the land.
This tactic both impairs the debtor's fresh start and violates the notion of
creditor equality because the mortgage holder will get paid in full on part
of its unsecured claim. These policy concerns coupled with the ambigu-
ous language of section 506(d) would lead to a result at odds with the one
reached by the majority in Dewsnup.
Yet in what circumstances is the holding in Dewsnup applicable? The
Supreme Court has held that Chapter 13 forbids any modification of the
rights of the holder of a residential mortgage.2" 5 Thus the holding in
Dewsnup has no effect on residential mortgages in Chapter 13. Putting
aside the case of Dewsnup only has an effect where the debtor wants to
retain the property at issue. After Dewsnup, the debtor must attend the
foreclosure sale and bid against the mortgage holder for the land. Had
Dewsnup come out the other way, the debtor could have petitioned the
judge to place a value on the land. The debtor could then have paid the
mortgage holder this amount to retain the property free of any liens.
Thus, the cost of Dewsnup is the difference between what the debtor will
have to pay at the foreclosure sale and what the debtor would have had
to pay on a judicial valuation. The debtor cannot object that the judge
would have provided a break in the price. Rather, the debtor's argument
is that because the debtor values the property much more than anyone
else, and the mortgage holder knows that, the mortgage holder will
"stick it to the debtor" at the foreclosure sale.2 16 Again, the number of
cases in which this will hold true does not seem to be great. Moreover, to
214. See Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of Bank-
ruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373 (1991).
215. See Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 61 U.S.L.W. 4531 (1993).
216. See id.
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the extent that reversing Dewsnup would have decreased the return to
creditors, this would have led to an increase in the price of credit.
While these three cases might have come down differently had the
Court followed a dynamic approach tied to traditional notions of bank-
ruptcy policy, the factual situation presented in each of these cases tends
to be uncommon.
There remains one more potential cost to the Supreme Court's use of
textualism. That is the possibility that by not looking at bankruptcy pol-
icy, the Court simply misses the issue in the case before it. The one ex-
ample of this happening in the context of the Bankruptcy Code is the
Court's opinion in Union Bank v. Wolas, which addressed the treatment
of the debtor's payments on long-term debt immediately prior to the fil-
ing for bankruptcy.2" 7 The Code requires that those who receive prefer-
ential transfers from the debtor before the bankruptcy filing must return
the payments to the debtor. Generally, a preferential transfer is a pay-
ment to a creditor who would not have been paid in full if it had not
received the payment and instead received a distribution at the close of
the bankruptcy case.218 Such transfers in essence prefer one unsecured
creditor at the expense of other such creditors. Section 547 of the Code
identifies preferential transfers by first setting forth a bright-line test in
subsection 547(b), and then providing certain safe harbors in subsection
547(c) to protect certain payments which fall within the reach of subsec-
tion 547(b). In Wolas, the payments at issue were regular installments
on the debtor's long-term debt. All parties agreed that these payments
fell within subsection 547(b). At issue was whether or not the payments
were exempt from preference liability under the ordinary course of busi-
ness exception contained in section 547(c)(2). For exemption under that
provision, the debtor must have incurred the debt in the "ordinary
course" of both the debtor's and the creditor's business, the debtor must
have paid the debt in the ordinary course of both entities' businesses, and
the debtor must have made the payment according to "ordinary business
terms." '219 The Ninth Circuit in a previous case held that payments on
long-term debts could never qualify for the ordinary course exemp-
tion.22 It therefore held that the payments at issue in Wolas were prefer-
ences. The Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, reversed.
217. 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
218. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988).




The Court opined that "the text provides no support for [the
trustee's221] contention that § 547(c)(2)'s coverage is limited to short-
term debt." 222 As to the Court's argument in favor of its holding, that
was pretty much that. The text of the statute in no way excepted long-
term debt from its ambit, and the Court was not going to create such an
exception.
The remainder of the Court's opinion was spent rejecting the opposing
arguments. The Court rejected the trustee's reliance on the statute's leg-
islative history because "[t]he fact that Congress may not have foreseen
all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason
for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning. ' 223 The Court also re-
jected the trustee's arguments based on the policies that preference law
seeks to promote. Although the Court admitted that its holding was in-
consistent with the bankruptcy policy of providing equal treatment for
all unsecured creditors, it found that its opinion was consistent with the
bankruptcy policy of discouraging creditors from racing to the court
house and thereby dismembering the debtor.224
Justice Scalia issued a short concurrence. He stated that "[i]t is regret-
table that we have a legal culture in which such arguments have to be
addressed (and are indeed credited by a Court of Appeals), with respect
to a statute utterly devoid of language that could remotely be thought to
distinguish between long-term and short-term debt."
225
Despite Justice Scalia's parting shot at the lower courts which have yet
to embrace textualism, the Supreme Court missed the basic issue in Wo-
las even from a textualist perspective. Section 547(c)(2) requires that for
payments to qualify for ordinary course treatment, the debtor had to in-
cur the underlying debt in the debtor's "ordinary course of business."
The interpretive issue is what constitutes the appropriate baseline in as-
sessing whether or not a debt was incurred in the ordinary course of
business. Specifically, the question is should the bankruptcy court deter-
mine whether this particular debtor ordinarily incurs this type of debt, or
whether this is the type of debt that firms such as the debtor ordinarily
incur. To illustrate this distinction, assume that the debtor is a small,
221. The trustee is the person responsible for administering the bankruptcy estate, which is com-
prised of the assets that the debtor owned prior to filing a bankruptcy petition.
222. 112 S. Ct. at 530.
223. Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 533.
225. Id. at 534.
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closely-held company manufacturing disk drives. Early in the firm's
existence it borrowed $1 million from a bank. The proceeds of this loan
were used to provide operating capital for the business. The debtor has
been paying off this loan, and has not incurred any other long term loans.
Was this loan incurred in the ordinary course of business? If the court
looks solely at the debtor's business, the answer is "no." The loan was a
one-time event; it was not "ordinary." However, all similar firms may
incur long-term debt in order to finance their initial operations. Using
similar firms as the baseline would thus lead to the conclusion that the
loan was in the ordinary course of business because all similar businesses
incur long-term debt at some time.
While the Court thus missed the basic interpretative issue in Wolas,
the Code's text would have yielded an answer. Although the text of sec-
tion 547(c)(2) does not provide any guidance on the issue, the phrase
"ordinary course of business" appears elsewhere in the Code. In these
other provisions, it is clear that the term means the ordinary course of
this debtor's business, and not the ordinary course of business for similar
firms.22 6 The textualist judge would then invoke the canon of construc-
tion that the same words in the same statute are given the same mean-
ing.2 2 7 Thus, the textualist judge would conclude that long-term debts
are not incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's business if the
actual debtor has not routinely incurred such debts.
Applying dynamic interpretation to Wolas would not have changed
the result.228 A court using this method would candidly admit that the
text of section 547 does not provide any definitive guidance. It would
then examine the provision's history, which is as follows. When the
Code was enacted in 1978, the ordinary course exception applied only to
debts that were incurred forty-five days before they were paid.229 Section
547(c)(2) thus enabled the debtor to acquire and repay short-term credit
226. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988) (stipulating that debtor may operate in the "ordinary
course of business" without court approval); 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1988) (stipulating that debtor may
incur unsecured debt in the "ordinary course of business"). The legislative history to section 364
makes clear that incurring a "substantial loan" is not in the ordinary course of business. See S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1978).
227. See, eg., Washington Metro. Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925, 935-36 (1984);
BankAmerica Corp v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 129 (1983); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807, 826 (1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973); Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972).
228. For a detailed examination of this issue, see Lissa L. Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt
as Voidable Preferences The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78.




without fear of preference liability. The 1984 amendments to the Code
removed the forty-five day limitation. The 1984 amendments were not
accompanied by any legislative history explaining the reason for the dele-
tion. Congressional hearings on an earlier version of the amendments
focused on the arbitrariness of the forty-five day limitation; many exten-
sions of short-term credit exceeded forty-five days. Nothing in these
hearings, however, expressly stated that Congress intended to limit sec-
tion 547(c)(2) to short-term credit. Given this lack of a clear answer in
either the text of the statute or its legislative history, a practical reason-
ing approach would decide the issue based on bankruptcy policy.
Both competing accounts of bankruptcy policy favor the exclusion of
long-term debt from the "ordinary course of business" language in sec-
tion 547(c)(2). The economic explanation of bankruptcy law views pref-
erence law as responding to the problem of gun jumping.2 30 Creditors as
a group are better off beginning a bankruptcy proceeding rather than
relying on state debt collection law. However, every individual creditor
would, absent preference law, have an incentive to attempt to secure pay-
ment in full before such a proceeding began and thus escape the pro rata
sharing mandated by bankruptcy law. Preference law is designed to dis-
courage such attempts to opt out of bankruptcy's collective proceeding
by forcing those who engage in opt out behavior to return the fruits of
their efforts. From this perspective, it is easy to see why the ordinary
course of business exception exists. If a transaction is in the ordinary
course of business, then there is no attempt to opt out, and thus prefer-
ence liability should not attach.
This rationale for preference law is similar to the policy, identified by
the Supreme Court in Wolas, of not precipitating a race to the court-
house. The Court, however, erred in suggesting that excluding long-term
debts from preference liability would accentuate this problem. The cred-
itors' knowledge that they will have to return preferential payments de-
creases their incentive to attempt collection from debtors before
bankruptcy begins.23 1 Including long-term debt within section 547(c)(2)
actually hinders this policy.
The danger of long-term loans that the debtor itself does not ordinarily
incur comes from the fact that such loans are often for a substantial
230. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 122-50.
231. The extent to which current law provides an appropriate incentive not to engage in prefer-
ential activity is open to question. See John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences and Efficiency:
An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REv. 249, 264-65 (1981).
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amount. Long-term loans are usually start up loans and lines of credit.
Default on such loans often gives the creditor the de facto power to ter-
minate the debtor's business. The loan agreements accompanying these
loans usually have covenants which upon default allow the lender to de-
mand repayment of the entire loan. The loan's size ensures that the
debtor cannot meet the demand for payment in full. Thus, the nature of
these loans is that the debtor has an incentive to prefer the lender at the
expense of its other creditors. Failing to pay one supplier will not termi-
nate the business; neglecting to pay the financing bank will. Thus, the
gun jumping in effect occurs when the loan is made. The nature of the
loan itself ensures that the debtor, when faced with financial hardship,
will pay the long-term lender to the exclusion of others. Thus, long-term
loans should not be held to be made in the ordinary course of business for
the purposes of section 547(c)(2).
A dynamic interpretation based on the traditional view of preference
law would lead to the same result. One of the policies behind this view is
the equality of similarly situated creditors. According to the traditional
explanation of bankruptcy law, preference law is designed to protect such
sharing. Thus, one should read the exceptions to preference liability nar-
rowly. The narrow reading in this case would exclude long-term debt.
The Code needs an exclusion for short-term debt in order to allow the
firm outside of bankruptcy to secure trade credit. Many typical business
transactions involve short-term credit, the absence of which would accel-
erate the firm's slide into bankruptcy. Those embracing this rationale for
section 547(c)(2), which included the Ninth Circuit, view the elimination
of the forty-five day rule as simply the removal of an arbitrary line rather
than an extension of the ordinary course limitation to long-term debt.
Such an extension in their view would too far impinge on the policy of
equal treatment of creditors.232
The Court's failure to identify the real issue in Wolas ultimately causes
little harm because its decision does not preclude a holding that debtors
do not ordinarily incur long-term debt. Nevertheless, the case illustrates
a potential cost of textualism; by not examining the policy implications of
its decision, the Court may fail to appreciate the question that it is being
asked to decide. Arguably, a switch to dynamic interpretation would
preclude such mistakes.




b. The Benefits of Textualism
There is thus a cost to the Supreme Court's use of textualism from
both points of view of bankruptcy policy. This does not mean, however,
that proponents of various bankruptcy policies necessarily want the
Court to switch its interpretive practice. For both the traditional and
economic scholars, textualism is a second best strategy. In other words,
those who favor the economic account of bankruptcy law prefer the re-
sults generated by textualism to those generated by dynamic interpreta-
tion coupled with the traditional view of bankruptcy. For such persons,
gaining the benefit of changing the results in Toibb and Johnson would
not be worth the cost of losing the results in Ron Pair, MCorp, and Dew-
snup. Similarly, those who hold the traditional view prefer the results
generated by textualism to those that would arise under a dynamic ap-
proach tied to the economic account of bankruptcy law. For such per-
sons, the loss of the result in Timbers would in no way be compensated
for by the switch in the results of Toibb and Johnson. The benefits of
switching from textualism to a dynamic approach thus turn on one's
view of bankruptcy policy and whether the Court endorses that view or
its opposite. Each group prefers textualism to a dynamic approach that
embraces the view of bankruptcy policy that it opposes.
Clearly, those embracing the economic account prefer dynamic inter-
pretation tied to that account over the Court's current textualist practice.
Similarly, adherents to the traditional account favor dynamic interpreta-
tion tied to their view of bankruptcy policy over the Court's current
practice. Thus, for both camps, the preferred strategy is dynamic inter-
pretation tied to their own vision of bankruptcy law, with textualism as a
second best solution. The least preferred strategy is dynamic interpreta-
tion coupled with the view of bankruptcy law endorsed by the competing
scholars.
That dynamic interpretation is not a dominant strategy for bankruptcy
scholars stems from textualism's disdain for policy analysis. Deciding
cases without regard to bankruptcy policy ensures that some decisions
comport with one view of bankruptcy policy, while others dovetail with
the competing view. Thus, in cases where the statutory language does
not mandate a particular result, textualism ensures that advocates of one
policy perspective will embrace some decisions, while those following a
different policy perspective will embrace others. Of course, some deci-
sions will depart from any sensible view of bankruptcy policy. However,
so long as this last category of cases is not large, advocates of competing
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policies prefer incurring the costs associated with these decisions in ex-
change for the benefit of having a positive probability of prevailing in
cases in which the Court can read the statute in more than one way.
Thus, a switch to dynamic interpretation without specification of the
vision of bankruptcy policy that would accompany such a switch entails
risks for both camps of bankruptcy theorists. This state of affairs makes
it difficult to assess the benefits of moving away from the Court's current
textualist practice. If one were willing a priori to privilege one view of
bankruptcy policy over the other, assessing the gains would be easy. To
the extent that more cases are "correctly" decided, the better dynamic
interpretation is over textualism. However, one would attribute such
gains as much to the assumption of which bankruptcy policy is appropri-
ate as to the change in interpretative method. If one is unwilling to grant
either the traditional or economic view a privileged position, the gains
from a switch to dynamic interpretation are illusive. What for one side is
a gain, is for the other side a loss.
Thus, it is far from clear that a switch to dynamic interpretation from
textualism would promote bankruptcy policy. A high degree of conver-
gence between the two interpretive approaches exists. A substantial ma-
jority of the cases would have been decided the same way had the Court
engaged in dynamic interpretation. Moreover, if there is disagreement it
cannot be assumed that switching to the results generated by dynamic
interpretation would net a benefit. Only if one makes the a priori judg-
ment as to which view of bankruptcy policy is best can one confidently
assert that there would be a gain by switching to dynamic interpretation.
A proponent of dynamic interpretation might assert that the relatively
high convergence between textualism and practical reasoning in this data
set is a mere coincidence. Perhaps in the next seven terms the costs of
the Court's approach will increase dramatically. Perhaps the set of cases
which diverge from any sensible bankruptcy theory will increase drasti-
cally in both number and importance. There are two reasons to think
not.
The first is that the strong pull of the text of the Bankruptcy Code
often mandates a certain result regardless of the pull of competing poli-
cies. For example, consider the case of Pennsylvania Department of Pub-
lic Welfare v. Davenport.233 The Court in Davenport addressed the issue
left open in Kelly; namely, whether a restitution order was a "claim"




under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court had to address this issue because
Chapter 13, under which the debtor filed, unlike Chapter 7, did not con-
tain a provision excepting fines from discharge. 34 The statutory lan-
guage at issue was so capacious that the Court could not help but
determine that a restitution order was a claim. Section 101(4) provides
that "'claim' means right to payment .... ,,235 Thus, while one could
invoke the same policy concerns that supported the Court's decision in
Kelly, neither these considerations nor any bankruptcy policies are
strong enough to override the clear text. Indeed, Congress reacted to
Davenport not by changing the definition of claim, but rather by adding a
provision in Chapter 13 preventing the discharge of restitution orders.
Thus, part of the reason one can expect a continued convergence between
textualist results and those of dynamic interpretation in the context of
the Bankruptcy Code is the strong force of the statutory language.
There is a second reason to expect that, at a minimum, the Court's
decisions in the bankruptcy arena will be consistent with one of the com-
peting visions of bankruptcy policy. What is often overlooked is that the
Supreme Court operates in a hierarchical regime. Bankruptcy decisions
are rendered not only by the Supreme Court, but also by bankruptcy
courts, district courts, and the courts of appeals.
The triumph of textualism in the Supreme Court has not extended to
the lower courts. The bankruptcy courts, district courts, and courts of
appeals still often engage in a more dynamic approach.236 Moreover, this
dynamic approach is little constrained by the Court's decisions; the
Court's focus on the text of the provision before it gives the lower courts
little guidance regarding what policies to entertain. Indeed, the Court
gives the lower courts virtually a free hand to assess the consequences of
any decision they render. Thus, while the Supreme Court turns a blind
eye toward the policies of bankruptcy law, the same can not be said of
the lower courts.
234. Congress, subsequent to Davenport, enacted a provision protecting such debts from dis-
charge under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
235. 11 U.S.C. 101(4) (1988). This provision has subsequently been renumbered to 11 U.S.C.
101(5).
236. Bankruptcy decisions in the courts of appeals that used policy in reaching the result include
Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem, 754 F.2d 1436, 1440-41 (4th Cir. 1985); Lend Lease v. Briggs Trans.
Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1348-51 (8th Cir. 1985); In re CHG International, Inc. v. Barclays Bank, 897
F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1990); Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 889 F.2d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir.
1989). Judge Posner has expressly rejected the Supreme Court's textualist approach. Central States
Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.), cert denied 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
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The dynamic approach in the lower courts has two salutary effects in
assessing the benefits of the Court's current textualist practice. The first
is that these courts, especially the bankruptcy courts, may be better
suited to identify bankruptcy policies than the Supreme Court. These
courts have more exposure and experience in bankruptcy matters than
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has handled twenty-four cases
involving interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in the past seven years,
while the lower courts have handled thousands. This is especially true of
the bankruptcy courts which specialize in bankruptcy law. Thus, the
lower courts often reach correct results without guidance from the
Supreme Court.
As to those cases that do reach the Supreme Court, the interpretive
practice of the lower courts has a damping effect on the costs that might
arise from the Court's textualist practice. Recall that the Court tends to
entertain cases only where the lower courts have split on the issue.2" 7
That lower courts often engage in a dynamic approach to statutory inter-
pretation ensures that in many cases the lower courts have analyzed the
competing policies and reached differing results. This reduces the chance
that the Court will hear a case where its textualist approach will lead to
results which all would denounce as bad policy. For a case to get to the
Court, it often means that a lower court has found merit in each of the
opposing positions.2 38  Thus, while textualism will inevitably generate
some costs from a policy perspective because it at times generates deci-
sions that depart from both visions of bankruptcy policy, there is reason
to think that these costs will not increase above those found in this
study. 239
237. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
238. This being the case, one may wonder why a substantial majority of the Court's decisions
would remain the same under a dynamic approach embracing either of the competing views of
bankruptcy policy. This state of affairs is explained by the strong pull of the text of the Bankruptcy
Code. Often the two competing schools of bankruptcy policy might indeed produce different policy
prescriptions. But dynamic interpretation is not the unrestrained implementation of what the judge
views as the best policy. Thus, while bankruptcy theorists may often favor different results, often the
Code of the text requires the dynamic interpreter to choose a particular result. In other words, to
say that a result is supported by bankruptcy policy is not to say that it is supported by the text of the
Code.
239. One open issue is whether the strategy combination of the Supreme Court using textualism
and the lower courts using dynamic interpretation forms a stable equilibrium. The Court, especially
Justice Scalia, has levelled attacks at the lower courts' failure to follow textualism. See, e.g., Wolas,
(Scalia, L, concurring). If the lower courts change their interpretative practice based on these at-
tacks, the desirable affects of their current practice would be lost. Whether or not the lower courts




Against the costs of the Supreme Court's current textualist practice,
one must weigh the benefits. These benefits occur mostly in the area of
managing judicial resources. The Court has a limited amount of re-
sources to expend in deciding cases. In using these resources, the Court
must make two decisions: the number of cases to take and the time to
spend on each case. The number of cases that the Court hears has re-
mained relatively constant over time.24° All cases, however, are not cre-
ated equal. One would expect that the Court would allocate its resources
first to deciding constitutional cases. The Court is the final arbiter of
such cases; there is little expectation that Congress will settle the matter
if the Court does not, and Congress cannot change the Court's decision
once it is rendered.241 This lack of congressional control over decisions
increases the costs of erroneous decisions by the Court. Given this state
of affairs, one would hope that the Court would allocate its resources first
to constitutional matters. The Court should be the expert in interpreting
the Constitution.
If the Court engaged in dynamic interpretation as a routine matter, it
would most likely spend more time on a statutory case than it does under
a textualist approach. The Court under textualism does not have to de-
cide upon which view of bankruptcy should guide its inquiry, and how
the relevant policy considerations affect the case before it. Devoting less
energy to mastering the nuances of bankruptcy policy and then applying
them in each case allows the Court to do one of two things. Least likely,
the Court can allocate time that it would have spent on bankruptcy cases
under a dynamic approach to constitutional cases. This is unlikely be-
cause the Court probably allocates the necessary resources to interpret-
ing the Constitution first, and only then considers other cases.
Empirically this appears to be the case. The increase in the Court's
bankruptcy docket seems to have coincided with a decrease in its consti-
tutional docket. For example, in the 1986 Term, when the Court de-
cided one bankruptcy case, it also decided fourteen First Amendment
cases, six Fifth Amendment cases, three Due Process cases, and one
Supremacy Clause case. In the 1990 Term, when it decided six bank-
ruptcy cases, the Court decided eight First Amendment cases, three
240. The number of cases disposed of by the Supreme Court by written opinion, as compiled by
the Harvard Law Review, for the six terms before this past term is as follows: 1986 Term-175; 1987
Term-167; 1988 Term-170; 1989 Term-151; 1990 Term-129; 1991 Term -127.
241. As Justice Jackson observed, "We are not final because we are infallible, we are infallible
only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Commerce Clause cases, one Fourteenth Amendment case, and one Ap-
pointments Clause case. In the 1991 Term, the Court decided nine bank-
ruptcy cases, ten First Amendment cases, eight Commerce Clause cases,
three takings cases, and one political question case. Thus, it appears that
a heavy bankruptcy docket corresponds to a light constitutional docket.
Moreover, an inverse correlation appears to exist between the number
of bankruptcy cases that the Court hears and its total docket. The past
1990 and 1991 Terms witnessed a decrease in the Court's overall docket.
In the prior four Terms, the Court had been disposing of an average of
166 cases by written opinion. During the 1990 and 1991 Terms, this
number has dropped to 128. The natural inference from this fact is that
the bankruptcy cases are some of the last cases put on the docket. The
Court will decide such cases when it has a relatively smaller number of
what it views as important cases before it. The Court's resource con-
straints thus make it more likely that the Court will decide a bankruptcy
case when it has fewer other cases to decide. In other words, bankruptcy
cases are the marginal cases.
In this situation, the more likely effect of the Court's current interpre-
tive practice is that it can decide more bankruptcy cases than it otherwise
would. This is so for two reasons. One, already mentioned, is that it
takes more time to write a dynamic opinion than a textualist one. Sec-
ond, the Court's switching to dynamic interpretation would probably
generate more opinions. Disagreement will more likely occur among the
justices over what constitutes appropriate bankruptcy policy than over
what the words of the Code mean. Under the Court's current practice,
few bankruptcy cases involve more than two opinions.242 An increase in
the number of opinions would again decrease the number of bankruptcy
cases that the Court could handle. Thus, more disputes are resolved more
quickly under the Court's current practice than would be if the Court
heeded its academic critics.
Deciding cases more quickly is undoubtedly a benefit. While academic
theorists may argue for years over the proper resolution of an issue, for
many businesses affected by bankruptcy law it is probably more impor-
tant to have a settled result than the right result. Businesses need cer-
tainty in the law so that they can plan their transactions knowing what
will happen if they or their contracting opposite end up in bankruptcy.
242. Of the 24 cases in this study, only one case-the Court's sovereign immunity decision in




Textualism, to the extent that it allows the Court to resolve more circuit
splits than dynamic interpretation, benefits those who must live in the
shadow of the law.
The last effect that one should consider in assessing the competing re-
gimes of textualism and dynamic interpretation is the influence of the
two regimes on future legislators. I, along with my colleague Jason John-
ston, have elsewhere argued that textualism may benefit the democratic
process by preventing legislators from sending different signals to their
constituents and the courts.243 To the extent that the Court has policy
preferences of which the legislators are aware but their constituents are
not, legislators who share the Court's preferences can deceive their voters
by passing a vague statute which they know will be interpreted the way
they prefer, but may well be contrary to the preferences of a majority of
their constituents. Thus, to the extent that one believes that statutory
interpretation should promote representative democracy, textualism ap-
pears superior to dynamic interpretation.
The actual benefits of a shift to dynamic interpretation are thus far
from clear. The outcome in only two of the Court's textualist cases
would change under any conceivable bankruptcy policy. These two
cases, moreover, do not loom large in the administration of bankruptcy
law. Four other cases might change, but whether such change would
produce a benefit is far from clear. For both camps of bankruptcy theo-
rists, textualism is a second best strategy. Without textualism the Court
is forced to subscribe to one of the competing versions of bankruptcy law.
Making this choice is a cost to those whose view of bankruptcy law is not
selected. In addition, a switch to dynamic interpretation would increase
the amount of uncertainty surrounding bankruptcy law. While the
Court's cases evince little knowledge about bankruptcy policy, it would
be more costly in terms of bankruptcy policy if the Court entered the fray
under the banner of dynamic interpretation.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the assessment of the Supreme Court's textualist approach
in bankruptcy cases turns on a comparison of a number of diverse fac-
tors. Surprisingly, it does not appear that monumental consequences
turn on whether the Court abandons its current approach in favor of a
243. See Jason S. Johnston & Robert K. Rasmussen, White Noise: Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Strategy and Performance (August 1993) (On file with author).
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more openly dynamic one. The benefits of such a switch largely depend
on which policies the Court would rely in interpreting the ambiguous
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Against these potential benefits are
the costs of a decrease in the Court's ability to resolve circuit splits
quickly, and the effects that it may have on future congressional behav-
ior. There is an important lesson here for those carrying on the debate
over the process of statutory interpretation. They should look to the
consequences of adopting the competing regimes across a number of
cases rather than single cases to determine whether their debate really
matters.
This conclusion is also important for bankruptcy scholars. Such schol-
ars often write articles in which the implicit or explicit objective is to
convince the Supreme Court to rule a certain way in a particular ase.2
To the extent that the authors make their pleas based on bankruptcy
policy, these pleas will fall on deaf ears. Perhaps it is time for those of us
in the academy to focus more on what good bankruptcy law should look
like rather than attempting to influence Supreme Court decisions.
244. See, eg., William R. Mitchelson, Jr., Comment, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by
the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1230 (1984) (trying to influence Court's decision in
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)).
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